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**SPORTS-RELATED RIOTS: UNDERSTANDING GROUP
BEHAVIOR TO IMPROVE POLICE STRATEGY**

by

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March 2016

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**SPORTS-RELATED RIOTS: UNDERSTANDING GROUP BEHAVIOR TO
IMPROVE POLICE STRATEGY**

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ABSTRACT

When a celebration following a college sporting event turns into a riot, the consequences may be devastating to a school, a community, and the police department. This trend is increasing on campuses across the country, and the perceived randomness of violence has police departments and communities alarmed. Based on several assumptions, current police training and policy focuses on crowd movement and riot suppression, which minimizes the ability to influence a crowd to the point of *preventing* a riot. One assumption is that large crowds share group similarities. Police also use inaccurate behavioral markers to identify the changing mood of a crowd and base their response on these markers. This thesis identifies the differences among disturbances and focuses specifically on riots that occur following college sporting events in the United States, using supporting data from case studies of college sporting events between 1997 and 2015. Using the normative and social identity theories as models, this thesis shows that sports riots follow a specific pattern of social behaviors and shows how early intervention may influence the behavior of the crowd. Finally, it concludes with recommendations for police when managing the crowd before, during, and following a college sporting event.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAR	after action report
BOI	board of inquiry
BPD	Boston Police Department
LAPD	Los Angeles Police Department
MFF	Mobile Field Force
MPD	Madison Police Department
NCAA	National Collegiate Athletic Association
NFL	National Football League
NYPD	New York Police Department
PERF	Police Executive Research Forum
RRT	Rapid Response Team
SWAT	special weapons and tactics team
TPD	Tucson Police Department
UConn	University of Connecticut
UK	University of Kentucky
UofA	University of Arizona
WTO	World Trade Organization

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This research questions whether current knowledge of behavioral patterns can help police to develop more effective strategies during riots after college sporting events. The short answer is “yes,” and the longer answer contributes specific insight into how that can be done effectively. The study examines social behaviors in five cases and uses data from after action reports and boards of inquiry, as well as newspaper articles and other written sources, to identify fan behavioral patterns before, during, and immediately following games. While similarities were observed, they lack the consistency necessary to conclude why some college campuses erupt in a riot following a sporting event while others do not. This led to an in-depth examination of crowd behavior. In all cases that ended in a conflict, the crowds, consisting of both student and non-student fans, energized as the game continued and ultimately converged in the middle of a nearby street, eventually turning against the police trying to clear the streets.

Social norming and social identity theory are used as models to explain crowd behavior. Social norms are standardized behaviors within a group,¹ and these behaviors develop over a person’s life by social construction that occurs through specific social interaction.² Over time, what a person sees as acceptable behavior is developed and changed by social norms. Social identity theory (SIT), explains how individuals develop group cohesion in different circumstances.³ SIT shows that members of the group immediately begin inflating the value of their group (in-group) and diminishing the value of opposing groups (out-groups), thus creating out-group discrimination.⁴ Utilizing these methodological approaches, the research shows how the various stages occur and how police can use that information to avoid conflict while maintaining a safe environment.

¹ Elton T. Reeves, *The Dynamics of Group Behavior* (New York: American Management Association, 1970), 110.

² Peter L. Berger, and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (New York: Anchor Books, 1966), 132–133.

³ Henri Tajfel, ed., *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 15.

⁴ Ibid., 34.

Importantly, the study shows the conditions are observable by officers in the field, and this may allow them to adjust their tactics to more effectively provide public safety. First, members of the crowd must centralize in an area that allows them to develop their membership. Centralizing is both a physical and psychological process in which the crowd members meet in an area specifically to cheer for their team. Secondly, game importance and game intensity increase the potential for centralization and increase the energy within the crowd leading up to and throughout the game. Game intensity is a condition that occurs during the game itself. Close games or games in which victory is largely undetermined until the very end add to the energy of the crowd. Important games that lack intensity or intense games that do not carry any importance will be less likely to create the necessary energy to build crowd cohesion.

The combination of the social norming, game conditions, and social identity creates a predictable crowd response, and this allows for police to properly prepare. Understanding this allows for a number of recommendations for police managers to follow when planning for these events. Some of these steps include establishing the norm for the crowd members to follow before, during, and following the game itself. By creating the norm, police and university administrators reduce the chance that the norm becomes established through other communities' mistakes or through social media. During the games, police must fight through traditional crowd control training that assumes large groups of people may be dangerous and maintain constant contact with the crowd members, even when they centralize in the streets. Constant contact (versus pulling away to return with larger numbers) will reduce the potential for the social identity of the crowd to perceive the police as a separate group and a threat.

The data cited in these case studies support the notion that sports-related riots may not be spontaneous, mob-like crowds as previously noted, but in fact, may be predictable and potentially preventable.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis is dedicated to the police officers across the country assigned to work sporting events and who are too often faced with the dilemma of clashing with the very fans that, under different circumstances, they would be joining in celebration.

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I. INTRODUCTION

As the clock ticks down to zero, the nervous energy of the crowd synchronistically builds to the point of delirium. It has taken a full year to get to this moment, and the basketball team has the full support of the entire city. The media coverage began months ago, building the hype even more with comparative stories about previous championship runs. On championship night, the bars in the student districts swarm with patrons, all wearing similar-colored shirts and glued to the big-screen televisions. To get the best view of the game, patrons, covering a spectrum of ages from 18-year-old students to 50-year-old native fans, arrive early to stake their claim to a seat in uniformed eager anticipation of another national championship. The chants of their team escalate and increase in intensity with every tick on the game clock.

In the background, police officers stand nervously watching. Preparations for this night began months ago with crowd-suppression tactical training, formation drills, and operation planning. Also fans, police officers are torn between their teams winning and losing and conflicted about what potentially awaits at the end of the game. Win or lose, the moment the game concludes, the large group pours into the streets, joining other large groups from nearby bars to chant, celebrate, or commiserate. Then, without warning, the previously friendly crowd immediately and unexpectedly turns into a mob.

A. PURPOSE OF STUDY

This scenario plays out at collegiate and professional sports programs across the nation throughout the year. Law enforcement professionals have studied the anatomy of a sports riot for decades, focusing mainly at its operational components, and academics have studied the sociology and psychology behind these incidents. These studies have streamlined planning, equipment needs, and tactical approaches to quell a riot more effectively; however, in spite of these efficacies, these events not only continue to occur but seem to be increasing in frequency.¹ Few conclusions have been drawn that give law enforcement any insight for reducing or mitigating the violence associated with these types of events. This study highlights strategies and tactics that police currently use to managing large crowds and argues that current strategies miss an important step in preventing crowds from becoming violent. Several recent sports-related civil disturbances are examined to isolate social traits specific to sports riots, including student demographics, geographical areas of riots, grouping behavior, and police tactics. This thesis discerns whether recent studies about riots give enough explanation to influence police strategies for managing incidences or whether currently strategies are exacerbating the violence. The conclusion identifies predictive precursors to crowd behavior and offers recommendations to police management to prevent sports riots rather than simply responding to them.

B. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Violence surrounding a sporting event is not a new phenomenon. European soccer fans, called hooligans, have clashed with police and captured sports headlines throughout the 1990s.² Described as mid-20-year-old men with “deeply rooted and long standing features of the communities of specific sections of the working class,” hooligans tend to be rowdy and potentially violent toward opposing fans and the police.³ The United States

¹ John D. McCarthy, Andrew Martin, and Clark McPhail, “Accounting for Police Behavior at Disorderly Gatherings in Campus Communities, 1985–2002,” in *Conference Papers: American Sociological Association*, 1–41 (Washington, DC: American Sociological Association, 2005).

² Steve Frosdick, and Peter Marsh, *Football Hooliganism* (London: Routledge, 2013).

³ Eric Dunning, Patrick Murphy, and John Williams, “Spectator Violence at Football Matches: Towards a Sociological Explanation,” *The British Journal of Sociology* 37, no. 2 (1986): 221–244.

has also seen its share of violent fan conduct after professional and collegiate sports. Over the past two decades, college towns across the nation have witnessed an increase in these violent clashes, leading to inquiries as to whether police tactics could be causing or escalating the conflicts.⁴

Police training today focuses on limiting injuries and damaging property by quickly quelling these types of disturbances. Historically, the development of police strategy is based upon several assumptions about crowd development and often ignores crowd differences. This thesis explores these assumptions by examining two main topics: (1) the difference types of riots, the crowd dynamics of each, and other factors that may aggravate or mitigate violence; and (2) different police strategies used to influence these crowds. Although the examples for this thesis refer to different the types of riots, the ultimate focus is on college sporting events. The literature review gives a progression of crowd collectivism using Henri Tajfel and John Turner's social identity theory⁵ to frame why students quickly unite and why this fragile relationship sometimes leads to violence. It also examines five events at the University of Arizona through official police documents (boards of inquiry, case reports, and after action reports) as well as various departments across the country to identify common strategies for managing crowds. The conclusion creates a clear separation of the different crowds associated with different types riot, identifies common conditions seen prior to and during a college sports riots, and offers several strategic recommendations for police commanders when preparing for and managing sports events.

C. VARIABLES

The social identity theory provides the framework for understanding why people with nothing more in common than a brief meeting at a basketball game may quickly unite and commit acts that could arguably be outside of their normal behavior. By

⁴ Barry Pechesky, "Did Tucson Police Go Too Far Putting down Arizona Riot?" Deadspin, March 31, 2014, accessed November 13, 2015, <http://deadspin.com/tucson-pd-will-investigate-its-use-of-force-in-putting-1555164766>.

⁵ Henri Tajfel, ed., *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

reviewing current data on crowds, specific to sports riots, a clearer picture of what causes these conflicts emerges. Some of the data includes case studies from police after action reports. The variables considered are in Table 1.

Table 1. Variables for Consideration

Type of riot	Group Behavior	Police
Political	Formations	Attitude
Social reaction (protest)	Attitude	Uniforms
Celebration	Leaders	Equipment
Frustration	Reactions to police	Response strategy
		Formations

Limitations to this research include limited data collection, such as demographics of the crowd time or day, and accurate costs associated with police preparations. Other limitations are a lack of data from “successful” operations or politicized after action reports that lack developed conclusions.

D. RESEARCH QUESTION

The Tucson Police Department (TPD) faced its first riot in 1997 following the University of Arizona Men’s Basketball National Championship Game when thousands of excited fans poured into the streets to celebrate. This celebration abruptly sparked a violent clash with police, resulting in damage and injuries to students and police.⁶ Similar incidents occurred again in 2001 and twice in 2014. Although the police department varied its strategies between 1997 and 2014,⁷ the clashes still occurred. Inspired by this

⁶ Kevin Danaher, *1997 NCAA Championship Game after Action Report* (internal document, Tucson Police Department, Tucson, AZ, 1997).

⁷ Danaher, *1997 NCAA Championship Game after Action Report*; Richard Miranda, *2001 NCAA Championship Deployment* (Board of Inquiry 2001–06) (internal document, Tucson Police Department, Tucson, AZ, 2001); Sharon Allen, John Leavitt, and Greg Roberts, *Board of Inquiry, 2014 NCAA Championship Deployment* (internal document, Tucson Police Department, Tucson, AZ, 2014).

conflict and others like, I began exploring different police strategies for approaching disorderly groups, which ultimately led to the question:

Do collective behavioral patterns exist within the anatomy of a post-sporting event riot and how can this study lead to better-balanced policing strategy?

E. METHODOLOGY

The study begins with a detailed explanation of how police generally prepare for riots through an examination of training documents from several police departments: Tucson, Los Angeles, New York, and Seattle. Next, the study introduces two psychological theories show how people behave in group settings. Finally, data gathered from sporting events at several colleges across the country is applied to the theories to show patterns among the different events. Much of the data, however, has been gathered through boards of inquiry (BOI) and after action reports (AARs) surrounding events that took place at the University of Arizona between 1997 and 2015; this limited the examination of certain variables. Journalism articles documenting some events and other academic studies of sports violence provide some additional supporting data.

F. ASSUMPTIONS AND BIASES

Through the examination of the data, I discovered that police departments tended to report more on incidents that went awry, making it difficult to find data for successful incidents. Therefore, it may be difficult to compare data from unsuccessful incidents with successful ones, leading to bridging assumptions. It is also important to note that most studies of group behavior occur after the events through collection of evidence similar to the methods used in this thesis and without direct observation of the group dynamics as they occur. This creates the need for some scholars to create assumptions where the data could not be seen first-hand.⁸ However, I have witnessed two events and planned for several more. Although this may provide an advantage by applying first-hand visual confirmation, I also recognize that it may bias some of the data by creating assumptions.

⁸ Jerry M. Lewis, *Sports Fan Violence in North America* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 24.

G. CHAPTER OUTLINE

Chapter I includes a review of reputable literature beginning with general theories about violence and moving more specifically to sports violence. It also provides a history of social and psychological grouping theories to show scholarly opinions have developed into the social identity theory over the past century. Much of the theory discussed in this chapter is explained in further detail and referred to throughout the other chapters.

Chapter II explains of how police plan for large events based on assumptions about groups and their claim that there is a lack of consideration for grouping behavior. This pattern becomes more evident through a comparison of policy from several major departments. Chapter II briefly explains how stereotypes, such as race, culture, and economic status, are bad predictors of riots. It also shows how police have traditionally used behaviors within the crowd to predict escalation and then asserts that this technique may be deceiving.

Chapter III begins by defining the difference between a crowd and a group and a disturbance and a riot, and it establishes the difference between a sports riot and a social protest. In addition, this chapter provides the theoretical foundations for how crowds unite into groups surrounding sporting events, and it provides the framework for the rest of the thesis. Moreover, it provides explanations of social norming theory to offer general explanations how people socialize through the personal interaction, media, and social media to develop socially accepted behavioral patterns. The social identity theory provides an explanation to how people bond during a sporting event, thus creating a spontaneous in-group, and how this in-group unites against an opposing group (i.e., the police). Furthermore, this chapter highlights the same behavioral traits explained in Chapter II; however, it provides a more detailed explanation of their meanings.

Chapter IV introduces several case studies from the University of Arizona, as well as a study from the Ohio State Task Force on Preventing Celebratory Riots. These studies provide data to support the social theories explained in Chapter III, and they establish a decision tree for identifying the stages of grouping. Additionally, this chapter also identifies some social conditions that influence violent group behavior, such as age,

gender, the need to centralize, and alcohol use. Finally, anonymity theory is introduced as a conditional factor, and data points from the cases studies show how each factor impacts grouping behavior.

Chapter V provides recommendations, based on the presented data, for police managers to follow while planning for a sporting event to mitigate or prevent student riots. Some recommendations include better documentation, a more appropriate response, and further studies concerning grouping behavior. The concluding chapter, Chapter VI, discusses factors that may impact sports riots for future studies, such as how the time at which the game is played may influence the students' energy.

H. LITERATURE REVIEW

The study of why people riot spans across several academic fields, including psychological, sociological, and criminology, with varying opinions and theories as to how and why these events occur. Overlapping theories, case studies, and opinions have created the need to simplify the research by narrowing it down to three categories: (1) types of riots, (2) grouping theories, and (3) documents of policing strategy.

1. Types of Riots and Violence

To gain a better understanding about the types of riots, it was necessary to research all types of disturbances, from political protests to disturbances on college campuses. For example, Tony Milligan's book, *Civil Disobedience: Protest, Justification, and the Law*, provides an overview of how the Occupy Movement grew from a small, peaceful protest into a worldwide civil movement resulting in clashes with police.⁹ In another example, Stephen "Max" Geron's Naval Postgraduate School thesis analyzes four Occupy locations across the country to identify aggravating and mitigating factors in policing strategy, setting the tone for a softer policing strategy more in line with community policing models.¹⁰ Author Gordon Russell separates political rioting from

⁹ Tony Milligan, *Civil Disobedience* (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), Kindle locations 98–101.

¹⁰ Stephen Geron, "21st Century Strategies for Policing Protests: What Major Cities' Responses to the Occupy Movement Tell Us about the Future of Police Response to Public Protests" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014).

sports rioting based on the ideology of the event; however, he notes that the same underlying social issues are present at both types of riots.¹¹ There were many references in the literature to “celebratory” riots while referencing sports riots. For instance, Jerry Lewis’s book, *Sporting Fan Violence in North America*, differentiates between a “celebrating riot,” following a sporting event, and a “punishing riot,” which is a riot by the losing team fans.¹² He also discusses the difference between college sports and professional sports, drawing conclusions about age and gender as it relates to certain types of sporting events.¹³ The Ohio State Task Force also repeatedly refers to celebratory riots throughout its study, although it clearly delineates that this phrase is more of a convenient label describing sports riots than a descriptor.¹⁴

For the purposes of this thesis, a sports riot is defined as a crowd of people who, while in the process of celebrating a victory or commiserating a defeat following a sporting event, erupt into wide spread criminal behavior requiring a centralized police intervention. Isolated incidents, including isolated arrests, may occur during these events but do not rise to the level of a riot. These cases are not included in the data used to support the thesis conclusion.

Evolving over the decades, the study of violence has produced enough theory to create an educational discipline. In the context of this thesis, gaining a better understanding of what makes people commit violent acts will serve more to refute some common misconceptions rather than attempt to provide causes. For example, in 1976, the American Association for the Advancement of Science published the *Anatomy of Violence in Today’s Society*, arguing that social conditions (poverty, education, etc.) were the leading cause of violence in society;¹⁵ however, another study argues against

¹¹ Gordon W. Russell, *Aggression in the Sports World: A Social Psychological Perspective* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 135.

¹² Lewis, *Sports Fan Violence in North America*.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Task Force on Preventing Celebratory Riots, *The Ohio State University: Taskforce on Preventing Celebratory Riots* (Columbus, OH: Task Force on Preventing Celebratory Riots, 2003), http://www.unh.edu/news/news_releases/2003/summit/OSUfinalreport.pdf, 57.

¹⁵ American Association for the Advancement of Science, *Anatomy of Violence in Today’s Society* (Evanston, IL: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1976).

the social condition as cause, claiming that psychological behavior causes violent outbursts.¹⁶ These theories focus on the individual rather than a group. As a result, they fail to properly identify why people without psychopathic tendencies and people from affluent social condition may turn violent within a group setting.

2. Groups and Collective Behavior: Historical Review

Early studies of group behavior paralleled the limited perspectives of many scholars who explained the reasons behind committing violence by citing similar social conditions or psychological issues. Crowd behavioral theories date back the late 1800s to the writings of a select few authors who began studying the phenomenon where a crowd seems to override an individual's ability to act rationally. Gustave Le Bon began the discussion with his theory of a crowd mind as the primary cause of mob mentality, which dismissed some of the earlier explanations that cited insanity, lower classes of society, and criminal behavior as the root cause of crowd violence.¹⁷ Instead, Le Bon argued, "crowds were composed of normal folk who, by virtue of their participation, were *transformed* by some unique, collective psychological process in the crowd."¹⁸ According to Le Bon, transformation occurs in several steps: anonymity, unaccountability, and invincibility, all of which alters the mental state of the individual.¹⁹ This theory was widely accepted and laid the groundwork for a number of other scholarly writings, including that of Robert Ezra Park. Park felt that collective behavior was more related to social conditions and claimed that collective violence is simply a function of societal change in action or a form of "social unrest."²⁰ Herbert Blumer built upon Park's theory that riots were simply social unrest, and he also agreed with Le Bon. He discussed

¹⁶ Sherrie Williamson, Robert D. Hare, and Stephen Wong, "Violence: Criminal Psychopaths and Their Victims," *Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science* 19, no. 4 (1987): 454–62.

¹⁷ Clark McPhail, *The Myth of the Madding Crowd* (New York: Aldine De Gruyter, 1991), 2.

¹⁸ Ibid., 2.

¹⁹ Ibid., 4.

²⁰ Ibid., 6.

needing a system of conditions for transforming an individual into a collective, thus identifying a step-by-step transformation.²¹

Floyd Allport's predisposition theory rejects the transformation theory that individuals transformed into mindless collectives, and instead he argued that people never lose their individuality. Allport concluded,

A crowd is a collection of individuals who are [arranged more or less side by side and face to back and are] all attending and reacting to some common object, their reactions being of a simple proponent [sic] sort and accompanied by strong emotional response.²²

However, there continues to be debate about whether the crowd elicits an irrational emotional response onto the individual, or whether the individual brings a predisposition into the crowd. Allport argued the latter.²³ This point suggests that everyone in a crowd participating in riotous behavior intends to participate, which removes the influence of the crowd altogether.

Allport's theory spawned another school of thought about crowd dynamics, one wherein learned behavior, social influences, and personal frustration drive the individual into riotous behavior while in a crowd.²⁴ This position is partially supported by other social behavior theorists throughout the twentieth century, such as Muzafer Sherif, who argued that social interactions of the crowd created social norms that influenced individual behavior.²⁵ More specifically, Sherif argued that people in a particular group tend to cooperate more with groups of similar interest.²⁶

Many of these opinions focus on specific variables associated with riots or generalize about the behaviors within a group (individual or collective), making it difficult to associate a specific behavior with a specific result. Modern scholars tend to

²¹ Ibid., 11–13.

²² Ibid., 27.

²³ Ibid., 31.

²⁴ Ibid., 32–43.

²⁵ Ibid., 62.

²⁶ Fathali Moghaddam, *Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations: Psychological Implications for Democracy in Global Context* (Washington, DC: American Psychology Association, 2008), 83.

recognize the complexities of group behavior and how each different theory may add a piece the reasons. Recognizing how people identify with each other and the group seems to be gaining more traction among these modern theorists. For instance, Turner and Killian's emergent norm theory agrees with Le Bon's theory (highlighted in McPhail's book) but disagrees with his notion of crowd homogeneity. They state that bystanders normalize the behavior of a few individuals, perceiving it as the dominant behavior, and thus recognizing it as appropriate.²⁷

In 1979, Henri Tajfel and John Turner introduced the social identity theory, which states that a person's identity is determined by acceptance to a specific group.²⁸ This relationship gives the person a sense of esteem and belonging, while providing the group with loyalty. This theory has gained traction by combining individual and collective behavior, allowing for more flexibility than social traits and psychological conditions. *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*, edited by Tajfel, examines different social grouping theories over time, supporting some of the theories and refuting many others. He breaks down other authors' opinions about how individuals turn into collective groups and simplified them into three stages:

1. Social facilitation (initially coined by Allport in 1924) asserts that the mere presence of others has an "arousing effect on the performance of others."²⁹ Tajfel explains that there is conflicting reasoning behind why this occurs, leading to the conclusion that "contrary to the belief of Allport's, this process cannot serve as a conclusive account of crowd behavior."³⁰
2. De-individualization is the concept of losing one's self identify to the dynamic of a crowd. In 1946, Jung argued, "being in a crowd leads to the loss of one's individual identity, to an unleashing of the violent side of human nature in a 'frenzy of unmeasured instinct.'"³¹ Over the years, a

²⁷ McPhail, *The Myth of the Madding Crowd*, 65.

²⁸ Henri Tajfel, *Differentiation between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations* (London: Academic Press LTD., 1978).

²⁹ Tajfel, *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*, 55.

³⁰ Ibid., 58.

³¹ Ibid., 58.

number of studies were done to measure levels of de-individualization, including Zimbardo's 1973 Stanford prison experiment.³²

3. Contagion is the spread of a notion or idea “can be seen as an attempt to account for the levels of homogeneity in a crowd in terms of accelerated processes of interaction or interpersonal influence.”³³

Tajfel argues that a majority of the theories approach the topic statically rather than dynamically, which “leads to the conclusion that, in a properly ‘dynamic’ prospective on relations between groups, the variables deriving from presumed tendencies toward achieving equity, from social identity and from power differentials should be considered simultaneously.”³⁴

Sigmund Freud introduced the concept of displacement of aggression theory in the mid-1950s to explore conflict between people. The theory explains that people are born with the basic instincts for sexuality and aggression. Over time, societal norms repress these instincts, but people never lose them.³⁵ Freud’s book, titled *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, begins with an analysis of Le Bon’s theory about group behavior and adds a perspective of group psychology. Freud theorizes that people in groups are empowered by the anonymity of the group, overwhelmed by the emotion. He also distinguishes between two types of groups: one that is relatively temporary and another that is highly organized (military and religion).³⁶ He argues that the libido or love for the group unites it and turns the group aggressively against opposing groups.³⁷

In moving beyond social theory into motivation, Elton Reeves’ book, *The Dynamics of Group Behavior*, provides an overview what motivates a group to form and remain a group. Written from a business management perspective, this book focuses several chapters on leadership and followership, in addition to conflict within the group. It highlights several key points, such as the importance of group cohesion and how

³² Ibid., 62.

³³ Ibid., 63.

³⁴ Ibid., 448.

³⁵ Sigmund Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (New York: Vook, 1921), Kindle locations 103–104.

³⁶ Ibid., Kindle locations 366–368.

³⁷ Ibid., Kindle locations 162–165.

cohesion strengthens or weakens.³⁸ Moreover, Reeves describes group motivation, with power as a main trait. He also discusses how power within the group is attained.³⁹ This book spends little time discussing leaderless groups and tends to group both types together. Unfortunately, it also lacks solid data to back its claims, although Reeves cites other scholarly writings in support of his claims.

3. Spectator Violence in Sports

Answering the question about why people turn violent has spawned plethora of conflicting and supporting literature over the decades. In the context of sports riots, it is important to examine notable factors such as alcohol use, type of event, and other socio-demographical traits to see if a simple reason for this violence already exists. Jerry Lewis concludes in his book, titled *Sports Fan Violence in North America*, that young, white males were more likely to riot following championships or important games than any other demographic.⁴⁰ His study refutes that religion, race, and education have any more than a peripheral role,⁴¹ and his academic study offers data to refute earlier theories posed by Le Bon.⁴²

Arvind Verma wrote an article in 2007 describing different policing strategies to ensure public safety during public rallies or protests. Through the use of several academic theories for crowd behavior and “mob” violence, Verma attempts to provide police managers with predictive strategies to reduce clashes with crowds.⁴³ He establishes that:

The absence of police and/or their inability to control the large crowds enabled the people to congregate, organize and commit violent crimes. However, as soon as the police were able to gather additional personnel

³⁸ Elton T. Reeves, *The Dynamics of Group Behavior* (New York: American Management Association, 1970), 107.

³⁹ Reeves, *The Dynamics of Group Behavior*, 69.

⁴⁰ Lewis, *Sports Fan Violence in North America*, 66–69.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² McPhail, *The Myth of the Madding Crowd*, 2.

⁴³ Arvind Verma, “Anatomy of Riots: A Situational Crime Prevention Approach,” *Crime Prevention and Community Safety* 9, no. 3 (2007): 201–221.

and respond strongly, the mob melted and people ran away after a short confrontation.⁴⁴

The boards of inquiry following the 2001 and 2014 University of Arizona Men's Championship losses, discussed in detail later, came to similar conclusions.⁴⁵

Gordon Russell's *Aggression in the Sports World* is a comprehensive look into violence associated with sporting events. This book is scientifically and scholarly supported, and it covers a large variety of topics from theories behind violence to proposed mitigation techniques. Additionally, Russell not only spends time defining the differences between riots, crowd violence, and conditions surrounding both, but he breaks down a number of existing theories (those of Smith and Scott, Hutchenson and Drury) relating to sports violence. One theory is the "need for excitement," which posits that boredom results in violence.⁴⁶ This could be expanded to the student's need to "blow off steam." Russell also references L. Mann, who categorized sports riots into the following: "frustration, outlawry, remonstrance, confrontation, and expressive, the first letter of each category forming the handy mnemonic, FORCE."⁴⁷ Additionally, Russell also provides mitigations methods for reducing violence. Finally, Russell separates political rioting from sports rioting based on the ideology of the event; however, he notes that the same underlying social issues are present at both types of riots.⁴⁸

Todd Jewel, in his book *Violence and Aggression in Sporting Contests*, analyzes how the relationship between sports and violence from psychological and social perspectives. In addition, he theorizes that there is a higher propensity for violence at sporting events that have higher levels of violence in the sports themselves, such as hockey and American football, than in sports with less violence.⁴⁹ Moreover, he supports

⁴⁴ Ibid., 201–221.

⁴⁵ Robert Lehner, Kathleen Robinson, and George Stoner, *Board of Inquiry, 2001 NCAA Championship Deployment* (internal document, Tucson Police Department, Tucson, AZ, 2001).

⁴⁶ Russell, *Aggression in the Sports World*.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 147.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 135.

⁴⁹ Todd R. Jewell, *Violence and Aggression in Sporting Contests: Economics, History and Policy* (New York: Springer, 2011), 171–173.

his claim using evidence such game-day studies of violence surrounding a sporting event.⁵⁰ Finally, Jewel also examines the economic impact of violence and sports. This particular book is more evidence-based, using statistics and academic studies than other references.

4. Policing Strategies

The University of Arizona has experienced three major celebratory riots following important men's basketball games. In 1997, following a national championship victory, thousands of students and fans clashed with the police in the streets of a popular bar district. The 1997 after action report (AAR) and board of inquiry (BOI) provide details about the event, as well as police strategies and tactics. It explains how the Tucson Police Department (TPD) researched its strategy for managing future sports riots by examining the Miami-Dade Police Department, which is well versed in combating political protests. The 1997 AAR also fails to identify the type of crowd, assuming that it was comprised of "bar patrons and rowdy students."⁵¹ This report did make some national comparisons; however, these incidents were isolated events at bars, political protests, and a single incident related to the NCAA tournament in Providence, Rhode Island.⁵² None of these events compared to the demographics, size, or emotional level as the incident at the University of Arizona in 1997. However, strategy used by TPD for the following decade was based on the two assumptions that 1) rowdy crowds and civil disturbances are similar, and 2) tactics used for suppressing political civil disturbances will be effective for celebratory riots.

In 2001, another clash occurred in Tucson following a national championship defeat. Since this event was better planned than 1997, more research material was available. In addition to the AAR and BOI, detailed training plans and cost sheets were collected. The strategy following the 1997 riots focused on a show of force, equipment, and training; however, a large-scale riot, far worse than the 1997 riot, caused severe

⁵⁰ Ibid., 176.

⁵¹ Danaher, *1997 NCAA Championship Game after Action Report*, 1.

⁵² Ibid., 5.

damage to the business community and injuries to students, spectators, and reporters. A board of inquiry identified a series of missteps, including a failure to act on behalf of the command.

In 2014, University of Arizona students clashed with Tucson Police following a Sweet-16 victory and again following an Elite-8 defeat. Each incident was investigated through an internal board of inquiry to identify areas for improvement in police response. The documentation provided by the board, as well as news clippings, internal memorandums, and cost analyses, were collected and analyzed as part of this thesis. The 2014 police strategy focused again on a show of force, equipment, and visible presence; however, again the police were ineffective in preventing a riot. In 2015, the Tucson Police Department completely shifted strategy from that of enforcement toward a community-based policing philosophy. A “friendlier” approach began with gaining the community and business support to prevent violence rather than quickly suppressing it.⁵³ This transition to a softer style of policing could be seen as a trend supported by organizations, such as the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), committed to researching police strategy. In 2011, PERF published a best-practices series called *Managing Major Events: Best Practices from the Field*. Through a series of interviews of police managers, this magazine identifies best practices to a variety of high-profile events, including political protests and celebratory riots. The specific articles referencing sporting events focus on professional sports, although the lessons learned may easily cross over to college sports.

5. Sports Riots

Sports-related violence dates back thousands of years. While a majority of the research focuses of European soccer hooliganism, American sports have also seen large-scale disturbances. Examples include the Rocket Riots⁵⁴ and the Cleveland Browns Beer Bottle Riot⁵⁵ where frustrating ends to games resulted in injuries, damage, and death.

⁵³ JT Turner, “2015 NCAA Tournament Plans and Operations: After Action Report” (internal document, Tucson Police Department, Tucson, AZ, 2015).

⁵⁴ Andrew Clark, “The Rocket-Fueled Riot,” *Maclean’s* 113, no. 12 (2000): 70.

⁵⁵ Lewis, *Sports Fan Violence in North America*.

Information about the 2001, 2014, and 2015 NCAA Men's Basketball Championships gathered through Tucson Police Department board of inquiries and after action reports provide the data points to show how the police reacted to the crowd, which strategies were used, and which ones were successful. Other data was be accumulated from the University of Wisconsin (2014 and 2015), the University of Kentucky (2014 and 2015), and the University of Florida (2014). Each listed year represented a time when the given university's basketball team lost in a quarterfinal game.

Team victories also come with violent potential. When the San Francisco Giants won the 2014 World Series, the streets of San Francisco erupted with celebratory fires, sporadic vandalism, and clashes with police.⁵⁶ An examination of championship runs by the University of Arizona (1997), University of Connecticut (2014), and Duke University (2015) offer insight about how crowds develop and react during times of extreme excitement.

⁵⁶ "Violence Mars San Francisco Celebrations," *WBNS-10TV Columbus, Ohio*, accessed September 29, 2015, <http://www.10tv.com/content/stories/2014/10/30/san-francisco-ca-violence-mars-san-francisco-celebrations.html>.

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II. A LAW ENFORCEMENT UNDERSTANDING OF RIOTS

Social behaviorists have studied the madding of a crowd⁵⁷ for well over a century, focusing on social characteristics, group dynamics, and theories relating to aggression. Simultaneously, police departments across the country have continued to confront angry crowds in a stand-off that often results in damages, injuries, and, in extreme cases, fatalities. Each riotous case results in a study of what went wrong, who was responsible, and how to avoid future riots; yet they still occur. There are several assumptions that lead to common misconceptions of a riot, which cause police departments to continually make strategic errors when planning for large events. This chapter highlights these assumptions and explores how they developed, and it also examines how police departments approach crowds, disturbances, and riots.

A. CROWDS AS A THREAT

Policing a crowd is a complicated and uncomfortable situation for law enforcement. Any situation where police are outnumbered presents a significant safety concern for officers.⁵⁸ As the crowd energy increases to violence, the anxiety of police increases.⁵⁹ A simple noise complaint at a pool party has the potential of escalating into a major incident. An example of this occurred recently in McKinney, Texas, when an officer responding to a pool party was quickly overwhelmed by teenagers upset with his response.⁶⁰ The incident quickly went viral and resulted in political backlash against the officer and department, showing the public may not share the same perception of large crowds as police.

⁵⁷ The madding of a crowd refers to how a crowd transforms into violent behavior. Clark McPhail titled his book, *The Myth of a Madding Crowd* and in his prologue, he refers to the poem “Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard,” written Thomas Gray (1750) that uses this phrase in the opening verse.

⁵⁸ Thomas D. Kitch, “Police Perception of Riot Activity,” *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 7, no. 2 (1970): 123, DOI: 10.1177/002242787000700202.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 129.

⁶⁰ Peter Holley, “New Video Shows Texas Police Officer Pulling Gun on Teenagers at Pool Party,” *The Washington Post*, June 7, 2015, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/06/07/new-video-shows-texas-police-officer-pulling-gun-on-teenagers-at-pool-party/>.

Realistically, large gatherings occur daily across the country, and yet they seldom result in violence. In college riots, law enforcement officers are placed in precarious situations where they must keep the peace but must do so using the least amount of force as necessary and in situations where they are often outnumbered. A study of the Chicago riot following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King captured this dilemma, when outnumbered officers were forced to choose between allowing people to loot or placing themselves in insurmountably dangerous situations.⁶¹ Although isolated riotous incidents have received notoriety over the years, they rarely occur. As a result, crowds themselves may not be perceived as a viable threat.

In 2007, Chris Bellavita published an article in *Homeland Security Affairs* highlighting best practices for organizing large-scale event planning, such as the Olympic Games. When outlining the threat picture, the article focuses on external threats like natural and manmade hazards.⁶² Bellavita lists security-related incidents, citing “demonstrations” as the ninth most probable threat.⁶³ Another study of crowd safety examined gatherings at large sporting events. Although it focused solely on terrorist attacks, the author Gehring recognized that there are security gaps in large group settings and concluded, “Action now, both for mending the gaps in security in the present, as well as for preparing for well-reasoned, long-term solutions for the future.”⁶⁴ Both of these authors identify large venues as potential places for terrorist violence; however, recent trends suggest that terrorist attacks are declining, while sports riots are increasing.

Since the 1960s, there have been approximately 3,600 deaths attributed to terrorist acts compared to three deaths associated with sports-related riots.⁶⁵ However, since 2001

⁶¹ Kitch, “Police Perception of Riot Activity,” 123–124.

⁶² Christopher Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security: A Strategic Logic of Special Event Security,” *Homeland Security Affairs* 3, no. 3 (2007): 7.


⁶³ Ibid., 9.

⁶⁴ James Gehring, “Sports Venue Security: Public Policy Option for SEAR 4–5 Events” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014).

⁶⁵ Information about terrorist acts was compiled from known terrorist acts through Johnston Archives (<http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/wrjp255a.html>). The definition of terrorism may vary in interpretation however, altering final results. Information about sport related riots was compiled through an examination of news articles about known riots following sporting events.

terrorist attacks on U.S. soil have declined⁶⁶ while sports riot have increased at an alarming rate. John D. McCarthy, Andrew Martin, and Clark McPhail published an article in 2005 illustrating this point by comparing violence on college campuses associated with protests versus convivial events (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Temporal Trends in Campus Convivial and Protest Disturbances



Source: John D. McCarthy, Andrew Martin, and Clark McPhail, "Accounting for Police Behavior at Disorderly Gatherings in Campus Communities, 1985–2002," in *Conference Papers: American Sociological Association* (Philadelphia, PA: American Sociological Association, 2005), 41.

Considering the number of fans drawn to sporting events, in extreme cases of rioting, the casualties potentially could be quite high. For example, in February 2012, Port Said, Egypt found itself engulfed in one of the worst riots in modern history following an Egyptian Premiere League soccer match, where the losing team fans attacked the winning team fans, resulting in 79 deaths.⁶⁷ This potential for violence emphasizes the importance for police to properly plan and train for these types of events.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Alejandra Ramirez, "The World's Worst Riots," *Complex*, October 18, 2014, accessed July 12, 2014, <http://www.complex.com/city-guide/2013/10/24-worst-modern-riots/jos-riots>.

1. Police Methods of Learning about Riots

How police learn depends greatly on three factors: experience, training, and culture.⁶⁸ Each provides a lens from which new strategies are developed and tested. With experience come certain assumptions or stereotypes on a subject.⁶⁹ Stereotyping is a long-term evolutionary process that allows humans to quickly assess and categorize information.⁷⁰ Law enforcement must recognize that these stereotypes may influence how police plan for and manage riots.

2. Assumptions during Police Planning

When dealing with a large crowd, law enforcement is responsible for ensuring the safety of all people involved. As simple as this sounds, the potential chaos involved in this form of policing forces police to simplify the situation. This generally causes leadership to create some basic assumptions for the planning process. The first and most basic assumption is that a *crowd is a crowd*; however, as shown throughout this thesis, crowds are different than groups within the crowds and that awareness of this difference can lead to a level of predictability. The second assumption is that *crowds have an irrational mob mentality*. Generally, most riots begin as a form of communication between participants and the government.⁷¹ While all riots seem to end similarly, they differ in participation, energy, and purpose. Finally, the third assumption is *all crowds have potential for danger at any moment*. Police training is based on worst-case scenarios, which sets the tone that everyone in a crowd is a threat. It will be demonstrated that this mentality, although necessary, may be contributing to a collective mentality for both the police and the crowd. In *Psychology Today*, Dominic Packer points out:

⁶⁸ Harry W. More, W. Fred Wegener, and Larry S. Miller, *Effective Police Supervision*, 3rd ed. (Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing Co., 1999), 457–460.

⁶⁹ Hugo Gorringe, and Michael Rosie, “It’s a Long Way to Auchterarder! ‘Negotiated Management’ and Mismanagement in the Policing of G8 Protests,” *British Journal of Sociology* 59, no. 2 (2008): 187–205, DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-4446.2008.00189.x.

⁷⁰ Fathali Moghaddam, “The Psychology of Fear,” lecture at Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey, CA, April 22, 2015.

⁷¹ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, and Alastair Smith, *The Dictator’s Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011), Kindle edition, 200.

Assumptions made about crowds tend to be self-fulfilling. Assume a unified crowd and you end up with a unified crowd. Assume a dangerous crowd and treat it as dangerous—weapons drawn, orders shouted by megaphone, heads knocked—and you get a dangerous crowd.⁷²

Police culture greatly affects police training and policy, and it creates a difficult obstacle to overcome concerning incorrect assumptions. Packer discusses a possible assumption by police that all “protestors are the same as a mob—unthinking, irrational and inherently dangerous.”⁷³ He refers to this tendency as “unsophisticated policing;”⁷⁴ however, it has less to do with sophistication than simplification. With the number of incidents that police respond to involving non-violent crowds versus violent ones, it would seem more reasonable to assume that all crowds are non-violent. Although studies indicate that police culture may be influenced by outside factors,⁷⁵ such as politics and public opinion, and that changing the culture may be a slow process. A brief examination of the history of riot suppression may offer more insight to this statement.

3. A Brief History of Crowd Control

Modern policing strategy for managing riots began with military strategy and has slowly morphed into what is commonly used today. With some of the earliest accounts of sports riots dating back to 500 BC,⁷⁶ riot suppression occurred long before modern policing.⁷⁷ Hence, it was not uncommon at this time for the military itself to be used to

⁷² Dominic Packer, “Assume a Dangerous Crowd and You Get a Dangerous Crowd,” *Psychology Today*, August 15, 2014, accessed June 14, 2015, [https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/its-group-life/201408/assume-dangerous-crowd-and-you-get-dangerous-crowd](https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/its-group-life/201408/assume-dangerous-crowd-and-you-get-dangerous-crowd?destination=blog/its-group-life/201408/assume-dangerous-crowd-and-you-get-dangerous-crowd).

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Eugene A. Paoline III, “Taking Stock: Toward a Richer Understanding of Police Culture,” *Journal of Criminal Justice* 31, no. 3 (2003): 199–215.

⁷⁶ Robert W. Main, “Mob Politics: The Political Influence of the Circus Factions in the Eastern Empire from the Reign of Leo I to Heraclius (457–641)” (master’s thesis, University of Ottawa, 2013), http://www.ruor.uottawa.ca/bitstream/10393/26165/1/Main_Robert_2013_thesis.pdf, 8–9.

⁷⁷ Modern policing is commonly credited to Sir Robert Peel when he formed the Metropolitan Police in 1829. “Origins of the Metropolitan Police,” International Centre for the History of Crime, Policing, and Justice, 2009, <http://www.open.ac.uk/Arts/history-from-police-archives/Met6Kt/MetHistory/mhFormMetPol.html>.

suppress citizen uprisings.⁷⁸ Due to need to address the crowd efficiently, police departments often use military formations called *skirmish lines*, where police officers line up shoulder-to-shoulder carrying batons and shields as a line of defense to push back a crowd. The skirmish line, called a phalanx by the ancient Greeks, consists of officers (or soldiers) lining up shoulder-to-shoulder and moving in a synchronized formation.⁷⁹ These techniques continued developing over the years and eventually merged with modern technology during the Civil Rights era. Facing large crowds, police departments developed paramilitary strategies to move large crowds effectively using limited numbers of officers. Policing tactics have evolved over the decades, generally as a result of over-reactions or under-reaction by police, which ultimately led to harsh criticism or lawsuits. During the Occupy Movement, the nation watched as the protesters effectively used social media and legal system to influence the way police approach complicated social issues.⁸⁰

Recognizing the ineffectiveness, police quickly changed strategies, from frontal assault, commonly seen in the 1960 and 70s, to the more patient style of policing, called negotiated management, which consists of open communication between police and protestors.⁸¹ Many new approaches to protests have come on the heels of new technologies, which, in some cases, have reduced the potential for injuries and damage; however, these new technologies can be very expensive, both financially and in terms of public trust. For example, the use of pepper spray (oleoresin capsicum) on protesters was criticized during the 2011 Occupy Movement.⁸² Advances in technology, such as non-lethal gas and projectiles, have improved the effectiveness of moving crowds while reducing the need for policing to face off with rioters by increasing the separation

⁷⁸ Main, “Mob Politics: The Political Influence of the Circus Factions,” 27.

⁷⁹ Mark Cartwright, “Greek Warfare,” *Ancient History Encyclopedia*, 2013, http://www.ancient.eu/Greek_Warfare/.

⁸⁰ Colin Moynihan, “City Settles Occupy Protesters’ False-Arrest Lawsuit,” *The New York Times*, June 10, 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/11/nyregion/new-york-settles-suit-over-arrests-of-occupy-wall-street-protesters.html>.

⁸¹ Gorringe, and Rosie, “It’s a Long Way to Auchterarder,” 188–189; Geron, “21st Century Strategies for Policing Protests,” 149.

⁸² Milligan, *Civil Disobedience*, Kindle locations 98–101.

between the two groups. Although the overall police strategy has remained fairly consistent over the years, riot control remains a cat and mouse game where defiant protesters continuously adapt to police tactics, and the public continues to weigh in on favorable and non-favorable tactics. For example, the 2014 Civil Rights rally in Ferguson, Missouri that exploded into days of rioting resulted in harsh criticism of police use of military surplus equipment against rioters.⁸³ This backlash caused President Barack Obama to issue Executive Order 13688, which restricts the type of military surplus equipment to be given to local law enforcement.⁸⁴

Strategies for managing crowds have developed over the years through a system of trial and error, where one technique worked and was carried down to subsequent protests. This method of sharing information allows departments to use knowledge of a previous event that occurred in a different location as the basis for a future event. Inexperience with high-risk events adds the traumatic impact on the community when negative results occurred upon conclusion. The United Kingdom has been managing violent sports crowd for nearly a century and has experienced the most success in prevention in the past decade. Jerry Lewis, author of *Sports Fan Violence in North America*, wrote, “American police are much less experienced at handling unruly sports crowds than English police. English police have developed a variety of skills that allow them to fine tune their responses to crowd actions and circumstances.”⁸⁵ These approaches include centralized coordination, private/public partnerships, and in-depth studies about hooliganism.⁸⁶ It is important to note is that hooliganism more of a generic term created by politicians and the media referring to rowdy soccer fans. Hooligan behaviors have been described as more organized than sports riots commonly witnessed

⁸³ Tim Stellar, “Police Must Avoid Militarizing Crowd Control,” *Arizona Daily Star*, August 16, 2014, sec. News, http://tucson.com/news/local/column/stellar-police-must-avoid-militarizing-crowd-control/article_56cdde7e-6e47-52a8-8c81-e607f323961d.html.

⁸⁴ White House, *Recommendations Pursuant to Executive Order 13688: Federal Support for Local Law Enforcement Equipment Acquisition* (Washington, DC: White House, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/le_equipment_wg_final_report_final.pdf.


⁸⁵ Lewis, *Sports Fan Violence in North America*, 41.

⁸⁶ Hooligans are gang-like groups of English soccer fans known to incite large riotous fights during and following European soccer matches, “Public Order: Policing Football,” College of Policing, 2015, <https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/public-order/policing-football/>.

in the United States.⁸⁷ However, due to media attention, college sport riots are commonly compared to hooliganism, although the purpose, method, and violent tendencies are not the same, making it difficult to borrow from the lessons learned in the UK.

Currently, there are four primary systems used to managing large crowds (see Figure 2) that differ in design from very military to loosely military styles, depending greatly on the size and location of the crowd.⁸⁸ A large majority of protests are smaller in numbers and are easily managed by moderately trained, unspecialized units, such as officers on bicycles. As events increase in size, or for emotionally charged issues, special units may be organized to assist. For instance, the Tucson Police Department uses a small contingency of officers trained in crowd control and protestor device removal, called the Rapid Response Team (RRT). This team of about 40 officers can be rolled into the Mobile Field Force (MFF), which is the next level of militarized police units. MFF is designed to push crowds using skirmish lines, less-lethal munitions, and tactical support (SWAT).⁸⁹ Military forces, such as the National Guard, are only deployed when the rioters overwhelm local law enforcement resources.

Figure 2. Primary Systems for Riot Suppression



⁸⁷ Eric Dunning, “Towards a Sociological Understanding of Football Hooliganism as a World Phenomenon,” *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research* 8, no. 2 (2000): 141–162.

⁸⁸ “Police/Law Enforcement: Methods of Crowd Policing,” *Encyclopedia Britannica*, accessed May 30, 2015, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/467289/police/260930/Methods-of-crowd-policing>.

⁸⁹ Tucson Police Department, “Mobile Field Force Refresher Training: Part 1” (internal document, Tucson Police Department, Tucson, AZ).

B. TRAINING, POLICY, AND STRATEGY

Training and policy for managing large events and disturbances differs from agency to agency, city to city. As a result, the law enforcement discipline still lacks current, collective standards for training police officers to manage sporting event crowds. Many police departments have written policy for managing demonstrations and political protests; however, rarely does policy get any deeper than superficial overviews, mainly due to the complexities of each event, making training increasingly important. Examples tend to focus on chain of command, use of force, and other tactical considerations. For example, the Seattle Police Department manual gives the incident commander the tactical authority to achieve specific objective:

- Containment: to confine a demonstration
- Complete containment of a demonstration without a dispersal route will only be done as a prelude to a mass arrest situation
- Isolation: to prevent the growth of the demonstration and to deny access to those who are not involved, for their own safety
- Prevention of escalation: to defuse the situation through warnings and verbal persuasion
- Dispersal: to disperse the demonstration in a predetermined direction and take enforcement action against violators⁹⁰

The objective for how to “prevent the escalation” seems to be left to interpretation by the commander. Boston Police Department (BPD) takes this a step further by including methods to de-escalating crowds. BPD policy manual reads:

In crowd control situations where the demonstrators are engaged in unlawful conduct, the Department shall make reasonable efforts to employ ‘non-arrest’ methods of crowd management as the primary means of restoring order. Such methods can be, but are not limited to, establishing contact with the crowd and obtaining voluntary compliance with police directives to minimize enforcement actions. Should such methods prove unsuccessful, arrests shall be made for violations of the law in order to

⁹⁰ “Seattle Police Department Manual,” 2015, <http://www.seattle.gov/police-manual/title-14---emergency-operations/14090---crowd-management>.

restore and maintain order, protect life and property and protect vital facilities and infrastructures.⁹¹

The New York Police Department's policy provides a "checklist" approach to managing an event,⁹² while the Los Angeles Police Department policy uses both a checklist reference and a more detailed method to managing large crowds and disturbances.⁹³ However, often and as a result, each event is managed similarly, although these same complexities would encourage unique responses. Officers depend on specific training to gain a deeper insight into specific topics. In the case of riots, the training remains fairly generic by often combining different types of groups into a single category: rioters. One example occurred prior to the 2015 NCAA Men's Basketball Championships by the Tucson Police Department. The training categorized a riot into the following four stages:

- Casual
 - No common bond, interest, or purpose
- Conventional
 - A deliberate and appointed purpose
 - Deliver a message
- Hostile/aggressive
 - Likely to erupt into unlawful behavior
- Riot/mob
 - Intensive excitement/agitation, loss of sense of reason and respect for law; follow leaders in lawless acts, anonymity in actions.⁹⁴

⁹¹ "Boston Police Department Rule and Procedures, Rule 200, Critical Incident Management," <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5086f19ce4b0ad16ff15598d/t/52af5eb2e4b0dbce9d22a76e/1387224754903/Rule+200.pdf>.

⁹² New York Police Department, *Patrol Guide: Mobilization/Emergency Incidents: Policing Special Events/Crowd Control* (New York: New York Police Department, 2013), https://muckrock.s3.amazonaws.com/foia_files/213-11_Policing_Special_Events-Crowd_Control.pdf.

⁹³ Los Angeles Police Department, Emergency Preparedness Unit, Emergency Operations Division, Special Operations Bureau, *Supervisor's Field Operations Guide* (Los Angeles: Los Angeles Police Department, 2009), 14–19.

⁹⁴ Tucson Police Department, "Mobile Field Force Refresher Training: Part 1."

Phase 1 is a casual, impersonal relationship between the individuals of the group but lacks a common bond or purpose. The conventional phase, or Phase 2, requires the crowd to have a “deliberate and appointed purpose,” or the need to “deliver a message.” Phase 3 is a hostile crowd “likely to erupt into unlawful behavior.”⁹⁵ During Phase 4, the crowd experiences intensive excitement or agitation, resulting in a loss of any sense of reason and respect for the law.⁹⁶ Although these stages lack support from any academic study when created, they were created based on the knowledge of three previous riots of which the Tucson police crowd management instructors had personal experiences, which is a common practice in law enforcement. When an agency lacks this experience, departments tend to take pieces of training from a more experienced agency and adapt to local needs. An example of this occurred at the University of Arizona in 1997 during the NCAA Men’s Basketball Championships when Tucson police contacted Miami-Dade Police for training recommendations for dealing with riots.⁹⁷

Some larger departments use specific strategies when managing crowds to prevent them from growing to unmanageable numbers. Once such strategy, called “command and control,” has recently emerged in local planning and has proven to be effective. Spearheaded by departments such as the New York City Police Department and the Boston Police Department, this strategy fragments the crowd into smaller sections using large concrete barriers or smaller metal pedestrian rails.⁹⁸

C. INFLUENCES ON TRAINING, POLICY, AND STRATEGY

Although communities may share characteristics, every community is unique. This becomes more evident when questioning why one college town of similar size and demographic explodes in a riot following a rivalry football game while another does not. While one community violently protests perceived disparities, another may protest peacefully. Departments that share experiences to build policy must consider these

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Danaher, *1997 NCAA Championship Game after Action Report*.

⁹⁸ “Police/Law Enforcement: Methods of Crowd Policing,” *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

differences, or there may be unintended consequences. For example, while the Miami-Dade Police Department is noted for having significant experience in civil disturbances, the city of Tucson is primarily a college town with significantly fewer political protests. At the same time, Tucson is a lively college basketball town and experiences sports riots following games.

The United Kingdom has dealt with rioting following soccer matches for a good part of a century; however, it is only in the past decade have they developed the necessary tools to reduce the violence. One such tool is how the public perceives the rioters, or hooligans, versus how the public perceives the policing tactics to stop them. The United Kingdom has continuously created messaging through “political, media and legal discourse” that hooligans are “serious, damaging, and embarrassing” to the sport of soccer.⁹⁹ Recognizing the safety issues, political fallout, and economic impact of hooliganism, police in the UK have taken a hard stance on unruly behavior.¹⁰⁰ The U.S. often takes a slightly different stance.

U.S. policing strategies are commonly criticized when conflict results in police use of force against the crowd. A good example occurred in Seattle in 1999, when three days of violence broke out surrounding the World Trade Organization (WTO) summit. The Seattle Police Department was harshly criticized for being understaffed and unprepared for the large number of anarchists who arrived to openly protest.¹⁰¹ At the same time, police in Ferguson, Missouri were criticized for overreacting to protestors during the weeklong Civil Rights protest in 2015.¹⁰² Norm Stamper, Seattle Police Department’s chief during the 1999 WTO riots, told the *Washington Post*, “We gassed fellow Americans engaging in civil disobedience.... We set a number of precedents, most

⁹⁹ Joel Rockwood, and Geoff Pearson, “The Hooligan: Positive Fan Attitude to Football ‘Hooliganism.’” *International Review for the Sociology of Sport* 47, no. 2 (2010): 149–164. DOI: 10.1177/1012690210388455.

¹⁰⁰ Clifford Scott, and Geoff Pearson, “Football Banning Orders, Proportionality, and Public Order Policing,” *The Howard Journal* 45, no. 3 (2006): 241–254.

¹⁰¹ Peter Doyle, “Anatomy of a Riot,” *MSNBC Investigates*, May 22, 2001, <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0880666/>.

¹⁰² Jamelle Bouie. “How Outrageous Police Actions Turned the Ferguson Demonstrations into a Disaster,” *National Post*, accessed June 7, 2015, <http://news.nationalpost.com/news/how-outrageous-police-actions-turned-the-ferguson-demonstrations-into-a-disaster>.

of them bad. And police departments across the country learned all the wrong lessons from us. That's disheartening.”¹⁰³ Once the police resort to using force against citizens, public opinion of the police is affected. Following the Ferguson riots in 2014, a Gallup Poll showed that non-whites who viewed police officers as ethical dropped 22 percent.¹⁰⁴ Even the hard stance of policing hooligans in the UK is not without criticism, even though it has effectively reduced conflicts with the police. A 2006 article published in the *Howard Journal* questioned whether Football Banning Orders amounted to overreaction by infringing on civil liberties.¹⁰⁵

D. FALSE PREDICTORS TO SPORTS RIOTS

Over the years, scholars have examined traits such as race, religion, employment types, genders, and age to determine if one particular demographic leads to more violent behavior. In 1983, McPhail and Wohlstein examined the stages of gatherings and identified a number of useful social traits to riots. Although they admit their research is underdeveloped, it spawned other studies to compare riotous behavior similarly, such as socioeconomically indicators or existing racial tensions.¹⁰⁶ In a hearing over racial disparity, the Kerner Commission concluded, “Today’s poor people find it harder to escape from poverty than 20 years ago. In addition to the worsening of poverty 20 years later today, there is a greater and widening gap on the basis of race.”¹⁰⁷

Conflict theories examine how difference in perceived equity among societies cause conflict and are used to explain how a community that is experiencing tension due to social, racial, and/or economic separation may use a sporting event to rally behind and find itself protesting over disparities. Even so, studies have found no evidence linking

¹⁰³ Radley Balko, “After Ferguson, How Should Police Respond to Protests?” *The Washington Post*, August 14, 2014.

¹⁰⁴ Jeffrey M. Jones, “Drop among Nonwhites Drives U.S. Police Honesty Ratings Down,” Princeton, NJ: Gallup Poll, December 18, 2014, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/180230/drop-among-nonwhites-drives-police-honesty-ratings-down.aspx>.

¹⁰⁵ Scott, and Pearson, “Football Banning Orders, Proportionality,” 241–254.

¹⁰⁶ American Association for the Advancement of Science, *Anatomy of Violence in Today’s Society*.

¹⁰⁷ *Twenty Years after the Kerner Commission: The Need for a New Civil Rights Agenda*, hearing before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives (110th Cong.) (1988),

race, education level, religion, or occupation as valid explanations to why people riot, only to why they may be upset.¹⁰⁸ Several studies have shown age (early 20s) and gender (male) as a common trait.¹⁰⁹ These conclusions have been substantiated in studies about hooliganism in the UK, although studies have also associated hooligans to the working class.¹¹⁰ This is something that has not been established in sports rioting of the United States. Other authors, such as Dunning, Murphy, and Williams, agree with this theory but expand it by arguing, “more conflict prone, and hence more violent, societies develop more extreme emotional dispositions and the dam for self control can be breached more easily.”¹¹¹ Again, as a predictor, this theory would not apply to college students, since there is no known study establishing them as a “conflict prone” society.

Another poor predictor for a riot is the location of the event and whether the fans witnessed the violence of the sport or a social injustice within the contest. In 1955, the Rocket Richards Riot was blamed on a perceived poorly officiated hockey and resulted in days of rioting.¹¹² Perceived social injustices may also trigger violent fan reactions. In the case of sporting events, the referee is seen as the authority. This theory may be more similar to hooliganism, which academics suggests occurs initially as “sporadic violence inside the stadium directed mainly at referees and players;”¹¹³ however, in the case of Rocket Richards Riot, the rioters poured out into the streets, resulting in injuries and tens of thousands of dollars of damage. Again, these theories lack consistency for them to be valid predictors of a riot.

¹⁰⁸ Lewis, *Sports Fan Violence in North America*, 66–69.

¹⁰⁹ Dunning, Murphy, and Williams, “Spectator Violence at Football Matches,” 221–244.

¹¹⁰ Dunning, Murphy, and Williams, “Spectator Violence at Football Matches,” 221–244; Lewis, *Sports Fan Violence in North America*, 66–67.

¹¹¹ Paddy Dolan, and John Connolly, “Emotions, Violence, and Social Belonging: An Eliasian Analysis of Sports Spectatorship,” *British Sociological Association* 48 no. 2 (2014): 288–289, DOI: 10.1177/0038038512474729.

¹¹² Clark, “The Rocket-Fueled Riot,” 70.

¹¹³ Jewell, *Violence and Aggression in Sporting Contests*, 172.

E. POLICE AGGRESSION

Following the 2014 student riot at the University of Arizona, members of the media questioned whether the police response to student behavior contributed to the conflict.¹¹⁴ Realistically, police presence may increase tensions in all situations to which an officer responds. Recognizing this, police policies include “officer presence” in the use of force continuum.¹¹⁵ In an environment highly charged with emotions, the way officers dress, line up in a skirmish line, and move the crowd are all statements of force, and they give the police the ability to escalate or de-escalate the situations. Jerry Lewis refers to this as an “arena for the violence,” where the police aggression sets the tone and eventually escalates the crowds into a mob.¹¹⁶

A study based out of the United Kingdom examined sports violence from the perspective of how crowds group together. This study concludes that current police training and crowd interaction in the UK are based upon LeBon’s classical view of crowd behavior, where normal people become irrational due to a few “agitators.”¹¹⁷ Although UK police attempt to identify the ringleaders, the inability to do so may result in the police addressing the crowd as a whole, thus creating the conflict they hoped to avoid.¹¹⁸ However, to assert that police presence or that over-aggressive police tactics *causes* conflict is speculative, at best.

While each of the previous examples may have found supporting data under certain situations that result in a sports riot, they all lack direct and conclusive causation. The next chapter will offer an alternative explanation using social norming and the social identity theory.

¹¹⁴ Pechesky, ‘Did Tucson Police Go Too Far Putting down Arizona Riot?’

¹¹⁵ Loren T. Atherley, and Matthew J. Hickman, “Controlling Use of Force: Identifying Police Use of Excessive Force through Analysis of Administrative Records,” *Policing: A Journal of Policy & Practice* 8, no. 2 (June 2014): 123–134.

¹¹⁶ Lewis, *Sports Fan Violence in North America*, 128.

¹¹⁷ James Hoggett, and Clifford Stott, “Crowd Psychology, Public Order, Police Training, and the Policing of Football Crowds,” *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management* 33, no. 2 (2010): 218.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 228.

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III. SOCIAL BEHAVIORS OF A SPORTS RIOT

If it's predictable, it's preventable.

— Gordon Graham

The 1997 riots at the University of Arizona erupted with little warning, making the response more reactive than proactive.¹¹⁹ Previous chapters discussed how police departments approach crowds, disturbances, and riots and how these perceptions may influence strategy. This chapter begins to explain how and why people group together under specific conditions, what leads up to this cohesion, and why it may result in conflict. It not only introduces social norming and the social identity theory as the underlying causal reasons for this behavior, it also begins to explain how this may appear during a sporting event. First, it is important to establish consistent terminology for crowds versus groups.

A. COMMON TERMINOLOGY

Some of the most influential scholars in field of social group behavior struggled with a common definition between crowd and group, often interchanging the two terms. For example, in 1924, Floyd Allport argued that a “crowd is a collection of individuals who are [arranged more or less side by side and face to back, and are] all attending and reacting to some common object.”¹²⁰ In contrast, Muzafer Sherif, argued, “The individual in an intense group situation acts as a member of the group.”¹²¹ Defining the difference between a crowd and a group based on prior literature may prove difficult; however, conceptually there is a distinct difference in the two terms. A *crowd* is defined as a large number people organized together in one place.¹²² This generic definition lacks any purpose or ideology linking the people together. An example is illustrated with the

¹¹⁹ Danaher, *1997 NCAA Championship Game after Action Report*.

¹²⁰ McPhail, *The Myth of the Madding Crowd*, 27.

¹²¹ Ibid., 63.

¹²² Dictionary.com, s.v., “Crowd,” accessed: August 14, 2015, <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/crowd>.

idea of people at a shopping mall. Although a common reason to be at a mall is to shop, it is not limited to this purpose. By contrast, a *group* is defined as “a number of persons or things ranged or considered together as being related in some way.”¹²³ The difference in nouns seems subtle, so it becomes important to examine the verb, *to group*, which is “to place or associate together in a group, as with others.”¹²⁴ By including an association into the definition, this term provides a more precise distinction of how both terms can be used to explain behavior during a sports riot. Clark McPhail describes the concept of grouping as *collective behavior*:

- Two or more people
- Engaged in one or more behaviors
- Judged common or concerted
- On one or more dimensions¹²⁵

To illustrate, the previous crowd that goes to the mall for a particular event may include several smaller groups of people that arrived to the event together or met for the purposes of the event. The individual groups, when combined, amount to the larger crowd. Crowds can develop into collective groups at various stages of existence, from beginning to end, or at any place in-between. This process occurs through a basic psychological concept called *categorization*. Categorization is the basic form of stereotyping, where people quickly assess each other.¹²⁶ A good example of this occurs during political protests in which the crowd that forms tends to already have a common ideology. Yet even in these crowds, not all individuals share an identical bond that leads to a group identity. For example, during the 1999 riots at the WTO Summit in Seattle, Washington, protest organizers complained that other protestor joined their groups and were interfering with their protest and “drowning out their message.”¹²⁷ In a similar

¹²³ Dictionary.com, s.v., “Group,” accessed: August 14, 2015, <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/group>.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ McPhail, *The Myth of the Madding Crowd*, 159.

¹²⁶ Tajfel, *Differentiation between Social Groups*, 61.

¹²⁷ Doyle, “Anatomy of a Riot.”

notion, it is important to explain the difference between types of events, since the underlying motivation of the event may provide purpose for a particular group.

B. TWO TYPES OF EVENTS

Events may be categorized as one of two types: *social change based* events and *non-social change based* events (see Table 2). The differences offer insight of the ideology of the players before the event even begins. Social change based events are associated with movements of longer-term ideology or intent for social change, while non-social change based events lack these characteristics.

Table 2. Types of Events

Social Change Based	Non-social Change Based
Protests	Large parties
Demonstrations	Sporting events
Stand ins/sit ins	Concerts
Marches	Celebration
Political rallies	

1. Social Change Based

Modern history in the United States has many examples of political protests involving large crowds. From the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s, to recent demonstration in Ferguson, Missouri and Baltimore, Maryland, large-scale protests open a gateway to potential violence.¹²⁸ Participants in social change based events share the desire to change some social aspect in society. Commonly referred to as “social movements,” these events tend to follow a pattern of activity that was first described by

¹²⁸ Referencing the police shooting of Michael Brown in August 2014 and the in-custody death of Freddie Gray in April 2015, which led to protests for improved African American rights.

Herbert Blumer.¹²⁹ Although these demonstrations both involve large crowds, they differ in purpose, mood, and ideology. Social change based events develop through two different methods: pre-planned and event-driven. Pre-planned events tend to be calmer with end-goal of making social change. An example of this is the 2011 Occupy Wall Street movement. Occupy Wall Street began as a peaceful and organized event, where decentralized leadership “formed committees and groups” and educated attendees on how to “effectively engage in direct action protests.”¹³⁰

Event-driven protests tend to be spontaneous, emotional responses to a controversial incident. The previously cited example from Ferguson, Missouri provides a good illustration, where a large demonstration resulted from a police-involved shooting of an unarmed African American teenager.¹³¹ As the event drew media attention, this incident grew larger and more emotional, the crowd turned violent against the police. However, these events generally signify larger, underlying tension, such as racial disparity or economic inequality, as in the case of the Occupy Movement in 2011.¹³² At times, preplanned events turn more spontaneous in nature, based on a number of variables, to including police response. Some examples include the Civil Rights demonstrations in the 1960s, the 1999 World Trade Organization protest in Seattle, Washington, and the recent riots in Baltimore, Maryland.¹³³

2. Non-social Change Based

Non-social change based events lack the political or social ideology. These events surround celebrations, parties, or other non-political occasions during which people

¹²⁹ Jonathan Christiansen, “Four Stages of Social Movements: Social Movements & Collective Behavior, Four Stages of Social Movements,” EBSCO Research Starters, 2009, <https://www.ebscohost.com/uploads/imported/thisTopic-dbTopic-1248.pdf>.

¹³⁰ Geron, “21ST Century Strategies for Policing Protests.”

¹³¹ “What Happened in Ferguson?” *The New York Times*, August 13, 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-town-under-siege-after-police-shooting.html>.


¹³² Milligan, *Civil Disobedience*, Kindle locations 226–227.

¹³³ Erik Ortiz, “Here’s What We Know about the Freddie Gray Case,” *NBC News*, May 1, 2015, accessed July 20, 2015, <http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/baltimore-unrest/timeline-freddie-gray-case-arrest-protests-n351156>.

would unite. Examples of non-social change based events range from concerts to sporting events. Since these events lack an obvious social or political ideology, they do not necessarily follow Blumer's process of socialization.¹³⁴ However, there may be commonalities within the crowd, such as the case with sporting events, where fans share a common admiration for the team.

This thesis focuses primarily on non-social change based sporting events on college campuses, although it does refer to social change based incidents for comparison. A thorough examination case studies, academic studies, and government documents resulted in a pattern of behavioral change that shows student-led sports riots have two distinct, although overlapping, stages: normalization and social identity. These stages may be overlaid with the timing prior to, during, and immediately following a sporting event and may have overlapping characteristic (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. Timeline of Social Behaviors in a Non-social Change Based Event



C. NORMALIZATION

According to a study by McCarthy, Martin, and McPhail, instances of college students rioting after sporting events have significantly increased in frequency over the past two decades, while the number of social change based demonstrations has slowed.¹³⁵

¹³⁴ Christiansen, "Four Stages of Social Movements."

¹³⁵ McCarthy, Martin, and McPhail, "Accounting for Police Behavior at Disorderly Gatherings," 3.

While there is a lack of data to show why this trend is occurring, McCarthy, Martin, and McPhail suggest that it may be because the police have adopted a “negotiated management” approach to demonstrations but still use normal policing tactics for convivial events.¹³⁶ Nonetheless, this only attempts to explain why student/police conflicts are occurring but does not address why non-social change based events are becoming a normal response to sporting events. However, social norming may offer more insight.

Norms are standardized behaviors within a group.¹³⁷ Generally, norms are established through tradition, although the process for creating and changing norms can vary from influence by the leader to the culture of the group itself.¹³⁸ Members within a group quickly recognize abnormal behavior and reject it.¹³⁹ This makes the process of norming an important factor leading up to a sports riot because unless the students accept riotous behavior as normal, the riot would never occur. Therefore, it becomes important to recognize how the norm is established.

Social norms influence individual behavior throughout a person’s life. Berger and Luckmann describe this process as a social construction that occurs through specific social interaction, such as a child learning from his/her mother. Such lessons are then applied to the “generic other” (society).¹⁴⁰ An example would be when a mother scolds a child for taking a piece of candy without paying. Through this disciplinary process, a mother has now instilled the social norm highlighted by eighth commandment, “You shall not steal.”¹⁴¹ In *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, Daniel Kahneman denotes norming as the modeling of someone’s personal world, wherein associations that “link ideas of circumstances, events, actions, and outcomes that co-occur with some regularity.”¹⁴² Not

¹³⁶ Ibid., 3–4.

¹³⁷ Reeves, *The Dynamics of Group Behavior*, 110.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 111.

¹³⁹ Daniel Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2011), 71.

¹⁴⁰ Peter L. Berger, and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (New York: Anchor Books, 1966), 132–133.

¹⁴¹ Exodus 20:15. *The New American Bible*, St. Joseph ed. (New York: Catholic Book Publishing Co.)

¹⁴² Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, 71.

only does this process of creating social rights and wrong occur consciously and subconsciously through daily interactions, it “is the highest form of cooperative activity among group membership.”¹⁴³ In the context of sports riots, the norming process begins with simple team spirit and builds into an identity.

Turner and Killian introduced the emergent norm in 1972 when they argued that social norms guide behavior of a group through social interaction.¹⁴⁴ Behavioral norming is a subconscious process of mimicking that begins long before the actual game. By interacting with others, people begin adopting traits, biases, and beliefs that translate to behavior. Even if some actions conflict with a person’s traditional values, through social norming, people will begin to accept new norms as resistance begins to fade. Philip Zimbardo gave examples of norming process in his book, *The Lucifer Effect*, when he documented the findings of the now famous Stanford prison experiments. Two groups of students (guards and prisoners) were segregated in mock prison setting for a week. As each day passed, the guards and prisoners developed a strong sense of group cohesion for their own group and animosity for the other. Although the controllers did not provide specific group norms, the players began to develop their own set of social norms quickly, which often conflicted with their own personal values.¹⁴⁵ With regard to sporting events, several factors lead to social norming, including community support, media attention, and more recently, social media.

D. SPORTS AND THE COMMUNITY

Sporting events have a long history of uniting a community. From Friday night high school football games in the Texas heartland to European football (soccer), communities support, rally behind, and fight for their teams.¹⁴⁶ Passion for competition

¹⁴³ Reeves, *The Dynamics of Group Behavior*, 11.

¹⁴⁴ Ralph H. Turner, and Lewis M. Killian, *Collective Behavior*, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1987).

¹⁴⁵ Philip Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil* (New York: Random House, 2007).

¹⁴⁶ Julia Roberts, and Cynthia Benjamin, “Spectator Violence in Sports: A North American Perspective,” *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research* 8, no. 2 (2000): 163–170.

and desire for victory acts as the motivating factor behind this type of fan support.¹⁴⁷ Sportscaster legend Howard Cosell said, “Sports is human life in microcosm.”¹⁴⁸ Through the triumph and tragedy of everyday life, sports gives people hope, offers avenues for bonding with each other, and provides an escape from reality. Sporting events are also a way for a community to unite. It blends genders, professions, and socioeconomic status together into one single identity, building a bond that in some culture begins at birth and may have the influence to inspire soldiers in times of war.¹⁴⁹ The bond begins with team itself and grows with each year of anticipation. Sports also bring out the competitive nature in people. Ted Turner once said, “Sports is like war without the killing.” A notion followed loosely by many athletes and fans alike, sports competition has long been a forum for people to challenge each other, release tension, and remain in good physical condition. The athletes recognize that abilities can only get a team so far. Other factors drive athletes to train harder and mentally prepare for to be champions. Jeff Pearlman explains this by writing, “In the world of collegiate and professional team sports, where so much emphasis is placed on talent, talent, talent, and talent (and, uh, talent), the thin line between victory and defeat is one composed not of muscle but mentality.”¹⁵⁰ It is this psychological mentality that pushes athletes to compete at the limit of their abilities and helped Bert Bell, the National Football League (NFL) Commissioner from 1945–1959, to coin the phrase, “on any given Sunday, any NFL team can beat any other.”¹⁵¹ This drive also gives fans similar hope and is the driving force behind the emotional attachment to the team.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 169–170.

¹⁴⁸ Terri Guillemets, ed., “Quotations about Sports,” The Garden Quotes, <http://wwwquotegarden.com/sports.html>.

¹⁴⁹ Ed Harris, *The Footballer of Loos: A Story of the 1st Battalion London Irish Rifles in the First World War* (Charleston, SC: The History Press, 2009), Kindle edition.

¹⁵⁰ Jeff Pearlman, “Winners + Losers,” *Psychology Today* 42, no. 2 (2009): 92–97.

¹⁵¹ Robert S. Lyons, *On Any Given Sunday: A Life of Bert Bell* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2010).

E. SPORTS AS A CULTURE

The culture of sports in North America plays a part of how players and fans all react to the energy leading up to a game. In the U.S., large-scale violence during a sporting contest—similar to that seen in the UK—is rare. It is unknown why this is true, but it possibly due to the sporting culture in the U.S. For example, Jerry Lewis studied fan willingness to participate in a sports riot and determined that a large majority of sports fan were opposed.¹⁵² Roberts and Benjamin associate some of that to the U.S. norms, which simply rejects the notation of stadium violence.¹⁵³ English soccer has a somewhat torrid reputation due to a small number of fans known as hooligans, who developed a reputation through the 1990s for random violent acts against opposing fans, players, and officials.¹⁵⁴ In one particular example following a football match between England and Spain (June 22, 1996), fans gathered in Trafalgar Square to commiserate a loss. This gathering-turned-riot resulted in a number of deaths and significant damage throughout London.¹⁵⁵ Although hooliganism is not seen here in the U.S., due to repeat media coverage, Americans are very much aware of the issues seen in Europe. Additionally, the United States has also experienced large-scale riots due to sports, such as the 1993¹⁵⁶ and 1994¹⁵⁷ Stanley Cup Finals. As infrequent as these events are, however, each event affects future fans. The previously cited Lewis study also showed that the number of students willing to participate in a sports riot tripled between 1982 to 2004,¹⁵⁸ showing that sports rioting may becoming more normal and accepted behavior. One author concluded that the “more conflict prone, and hence more violent, societies develop more extreme emotional dispositions and the dam of self-control can be breached

¹⁵² Lewis, *Sports Fan Violence in North America*, 61.

¹⁵³ Roberts, and Benjamin, “Spectator Violence in Sports,” 171.

¹⁵⁴ Dunning, Murphy, and Williams, “Spectator Violence at Football Matches,” 221.

¹⁵⁵ Peter Millward, “Glasgow Rangers Supporters in the City of Manchester: The Degeneration of a ‘Fan Party’ into a ‘Hooligan Riot,’” *International Review for the Sociology of Sport* 44, no. 4 (2009): 381–98.

¹⁵⁶ Graeme Hamilton, “Riots a Black Eye for Montreal,” *National Post*, April 22, 2008, <http://www.nationalpost.com/Riots+black+Montreal/464332/story.html>.

¹⁵⁷ Bruce Arthur, “Remembering the 1994 Stanley Cup Riot,” *National Post*, June 15, 2011, <http://news.nationalpost.com/sports/nhl/remembering-the-1994-stanley-cup-riot>.

¹⁵⁸ Lewis, *Sports Fan Violence in North America*, 60–61.

more easily.”¹⁵⁹ The more sporting events that result in riots, the more permissible these incidents may become to mainstream society.

F. MEDIA IMPACT ON NORMING

Media has long been known to be an influencing factor on the public. The hype surrounding sporting events is no exception. The Ohio State Task Force on Preventing Celebratory Riots identified, “the role of the community, culture, and the media in either facilitating or inhibiting [sports related riots].”¹⁶⁰ In a study about hooligans, the authors noted, “media hyperbole frequently has the effect of unwittingly orchestrating conflict through priming of aggressive schema.”¹⁶¹ A 1983 study by Carver et al., supports this, showing that through media priming, people who see “fellow spectators as threatening are more likely than others to become confrontational or openly aggressive.”¹⁶² Although these incidents may not have been published on the front page, each incident reported sets the norm incrementally. For example, game five of the 1984 World Series between the Detroit Tigers and the San Diego Padres grabbed national attention when the Tigers won their first Championship in 16 years. The celebration turned violent when fans set fires, flipped cars, and looted businesses.¹⁶³

Kevin Young identified this growing trend in 1988 when he wrote, “it is evident that violence in sport, both by participants and spectators, is considered by British and North America media to carry enormous ‘newsworthiness.’”¹⁶⁴ Media often has subtle influence over the outcome events. For example, snips of video showing students standing on top of damaged cars appear more like celebratory fun than criminal behavior (see Figure 4). Young addresses this specifically by writing that the media has a “role in

¹⁵⁹ Dolan, and Connolly, “Emotions, Violence, and Social Belongin.”

¹⁶⁰ Task Force on Preventing Celebratory Riots, *The Ohio State University*.

¹⁶¹ Scott, and Pearson, “Football Banning Orders, Proportionality,” 246–247.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Steve Thomas, “The Night the Detroit Tigers Won the 1984 World Series,” *Detroit Athletic Co. Blog*, September 21, 2014, accessed August 15, 2015,
<https://www.detroitathletic.com/blog/2014/09/21/night-detroit-tigers-won-1984-world-series/>.

¹⁶⁴ Kevin Young, “Sports Crowd Disorder, Mass Media and Ideology” (dissertation, McMaster University, 1988), 346.

dramatizing and glamourizing violence, and in providing an often irresponsible interpretation of behavioural models for consumers (and particularly young children)."¹⁶⁵ Subsequently, incidents resulting from sporting events have increased dramatically over the last 20 years.¹⁶⁶ Today, police use media relations to drive the narrative using a technique referred to as "image-led policing;"¹⁶⁷ however, the rise of social media has created an infinite number of "citizen reporters," which has changed the way the news is reported and disseminated.¹⁶⁸

Figure 4. Post-championship Game Riots



Source: Joshua Trujillo, "Photos: Arizona Championship Game Riots in 1997 and 2001," March 31, 2014, accessed April 9, 2015, http://tucson.com/gallery/news/local/crime/photos-arizona-championship-game-riots-in-and/collection_1ffcc542-b5f0-11e3-b4cd-0019bb2963f4.html#0.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 350.

¹⁶⁶ Task Force on Preventing Celebratory Riots, *The Ohio State University*, 20.

¹⁶⁷ Chris Greer, and Eugene McLaughlin, "We Predict a Riot? Public Order Policing, New Media Environments and the Rise of the Citizen Journalist," *British Journal of Criminology* 50, no. 6 (2010): 1042, DOI: 10.1093/bjc/azq039.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 1044.

G. SOCIAL MEDIA IMPACT ON NORMING

The aftermath of the 2011 London riots, which began as a protest over a police shooting, left destruction throughout several cities unlike Europe has experienced in decades.¹⁶⁹ During this riot, some politicians blamed the use of Twitter as playing a “key role” throughout the five-day event.¹⁷⁰ A report studying the 2011 London riot found that that Twitter was used to communicate information between social networks.¹⁷¹ Although data for social media is sparse, early studies show significant links between social media platforms and behavior. A 2014 study about social media’s influence in marketing determined that “social contagion induced from networked exposure can increase favorability assessments of ideas or products.”¹⁷²

Social norming does not have finite boundaries that stop when the championship game begins; rather it continues throughout the game and into post game, merging with the next stage, social identity. However, before this begins, there must also be certain environmental conditions.

H. CONDITIONS

Having the right situational condition is imperative for socialization to even occur.¹⁷³ This condition may be quite complex when involving political and ethno-nationalist perspectives;¹⁷⁴ however, in the case of sports riots, it is created by the event itself. For a sports riot to occur, a series of situational conditions must pre-exist in order to create the draw into the area. Additionally, since these events lack the emotional

¹⁶⁹ Rob Procter, Farida Vis, and Alex Voss, “Reading the Riots on Twitter: Methodological Innovation for the Analysis of Big Data,” *International Journal of Social Research Methodology* 16, no. 3 (2013): 198. DOI: 10.1080/13645579.2013.774172.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 198.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 205–206.

¹⁷² Hazel K. Kwon, Michael A. Stefanone, and George A. Barnett, “Social Networking Influences on Online Behavioral Choices: Exploring Group Formation on Social Network Sites,” *American Behavioral Scientist* 58, no. 10 (2014): 1356.

¹⁷³ Tajfel, *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*, 503–504.


¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 508.

impact like social-change based events, the emotion must develop independently as the event is occurring. Three situational conditions that must occur include:

- Game importance
- Game intensity
- Fan centralization

Figure 5 shows the relationship among these conditions and how they may increase the potential for a riot.

Figure 5. Importance/Intensity Chart



1. Game Importance and Game Intensity

Important games (championships, rivalries, etc.) and close games provide more energy to a crowd than unimportant games and contests with a large score differential. When examining the statistics associated to sports riots, every event that resulted in a riot followed a championship game or a semi-final game.¹⁷⁵ However, neither situation is an absolute indicator. For example, a survey of 32 universities concluded that 19 of those schools had experienced a riot in the past, while 11 had not. Of the schools examined,

¹⁷⁵ Researched by the author from various media reports between 1997 and 2015.

every school but one had won a national championship in a major sport.¹⁷⁶ Other schools that unexpectedly win games may also riot, even when it is not a championship game being played. Student burned couches shut down traffic after Dayton beat Syracuse in the 2014 Men's Basketball Tournament, although it was only the second game of six needed to win the championship.¹⁷⁷

The intensity of the game also factors into the possibility for a sport riot, although without additional research, this is only a hypothesis at best. Nevertheless, in 2010, researchers studied high school aged children in moments of controlled competition, concluding, “the highest levels of MBs (misbehaviors), mainly in the form of rule violations, occurred when the Intensity of the game was increased.”¹⁷⁸ In combination, important and intense games increase the likelihood of the next stage occurring: fan centralization following the game.

2. Centralization

At the conclusion of the game, the fans pour into the street to celebrate the victory or commiserate the defeat. Within the stadium, this behavior is known as *pitch invasion*,¹⁷⁹ and this commonly seen following basketball and football games or in European soccer matches. Despite a school’s attempt to keep the field clear for safety reasons, the students ignore the warnings and overpower the security. This issue has been attributed as side effect for schools making their fans a part of the action. A 2002 article written for *USA Today* about a coach arrested for striking a charging student acknowledges, “While the act is a time-honored college tradition and fans often are

¹⁷⁶ Task Force on Preventing Celebratory Riots, *The Ohio State University*, 30.

¹⁷⁷ Jeff Stein, “Dayton President Crowd Surfs, Riot Police Called as Students Celebrate Defeat of SU Basketball,” *Syracuse*, March 23, 2014, http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2014/03/dayton_president_crowd_surfs_riot_police_called_as_students_celebrate_defeating.html.

¹⁷⁸ Eitan Eldar, and Efrat Elran, “The Effects of Antecedent Manipulation on Misbehavior during a Playground Game,” *Journal of Behavioral Health and Medicine* 1, no. 1 (2010): 53–63.

¹⁷⁹ Taken from European soccer, where the field is called a pitch.

scarcely discouraged, it has become so commonplace and such a safety concern that schools are rethinking their wink-and-a-nod policies.”¹⁸⁰

However, NCAA basketball and football championships are generally played in a neutral location. For these games, students congregate in bar districts or student housing districts. As the game ends, they centralize in the street to celebrate (or commiserate).¹⁸¹ In 1997, the *Arizona Daily Wildcat* newspaper reported, “thousands of people flooded the city streets … and celebrated Arizona’s win by giving hundreds of high fives to strangers, turning over a couple of cars and streaking through the crowds of crazed fans.”¹⁸² McPhail refers to this action as “clustering” when describing his theory of collective orientation for the group.¹⁸³

A lack of centralization would impede the environment for grouping to occur, hence stopping the process. However, even when the students do centralize, at the early stages they do so as smaller groups or as individuals. A 2003 study supported this notion, showing that 74 percent of the people in a pre-crowd assembling pattern after an Ohio State-Michigan football game were there with at least one other person.¹⁸⁴ These three conditions (game intensity, game importance, and fan centralization) are more situational and environmental but are still commonly witnessed at sports riots. Other non-behavior traits are also commonly seen.

I. NON-BEHAVIOR TRAITS: AGE, GENDER, AND ALCOHOL

Age, gender, and the presence of alcohol are non-behavioral traits that are commonly blamed for causing riotous behavior. However, as previously discussed in Chapter II, these traits may be poor predictors.

¹⁸⁰ Steve Wieberg, and Thomas O’Toole, “Fans on Field Cross the Line ; Once-Fun Ritual Is Now a Threat,” *USA Today* [final edition], November 15, 2002, sec. Sports.

¹⁸¹ This was documented in the separate events at the University of Arizona: Danaher, *1997 NCAA Championship Game after Action Report*; Miranda, *2001 NCAA Championship Deployment*, 14; Allen, Leavitt, and Roberts, *Board of Inquiry, 2014 NCAA Championship Deployment*, 5.

¹⁸² Ana A. Lima, John Brown, and Tory Hernandez, “Loud, Naked, Drunken Fans Storm Tucson,” *Arizona Daily Wildcat*, April 1, 1997.

¹⁸³ Collective orientation occurs when people within a group begin behaving in similar fashions. McPhail, *The Myth of the Madding Crowd*, 164.

¹⁸⁴ Lewis, *Sports Fan Violence in North America*, 137.

1. Age

The bar districts surrounding college campuses attract many different types of people, from the younger college students to the older fans and alumni. Due to the drinking age restrictions, the people in the bars are generally 21 years old and older, while the younger crowds either mill around the street during the game or back at the student housing locations. Immediately after the game, however, these two ages blend when the bars empty and the students leave their “apartment houses, dormitories, fraternities” to converge at the bar districts.¹⁸⁵ It is difficult to show exact ages at events due to a lack of precise data, but a 2003 study of the Ohio State riot showed that the median age of arrestees was 22.6 years old¹⁸⁶ and that “of those Ohio State students who were arrested after the 2003 post-Michigan game disturbances for destructive behavior... 70% were either first- or second-year students.”¹⁸⁷ The same study also notes,

A common denominator of U.S. sporting crowd disorders, European soccer hooliganism, and the student riots experienced at Ohio State and other universities is that the disturbances typically have been instigated and carried out by young (average age 19) white males.¹⁸⁸

In a similar comparison, the median age of arrestees following the Richard Riot (a professional sport riot) ranged from 18–35, with a median age of 23.¹⁸⁹

2. Gender

The gender of those involved also follows a hazy but present pattern. The Ohio State Task Force reported that 100 percent of the arrestees following the Michigan football game were male.¹⁹⁰ None of the University of Arizona cases make distinctions between the acts of men and women, other than when women sit on the top of men’s

¹⁸⁵ Miranda, *2001 NCAA Championship Deployment*, 14.

¹⁸⁶ Lewis, *Sports Fan Violence in North America*, 48–50.

¹⁸⁷ Task Force on Preventing Celebratory Riots, *The Ohio State University*, 28.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 27.

¹⁸⁹ Lewis, *Sports Fan Violence in North America*, 48–50.

¹⁹⁰ Task Force on Preventing Celebratory Riots, *The Ohio State University*.

shoulders and expose themselves to the crowd.¹⁹¹ One study examined how people felt about rioting following sporting events, determining that “men were more likely to condone and enjoy a riot than were women.”¹⁹²

3. Alcohol

Alcohol has long been blamed for increased violence at sporting events, resulting in many events banning its sale altogether. Although very little research has specifically been done to support this theory, extensive research supports that alcohol reduces judgment and inhibitions at even mild levels of intoxication,¹⁹³ allowing for assumption to be made that the emotional impact of a sporting contest, combined with reduced inhibitions caused by alcohol,¹⁹⁴ could result in altered behavior. Todd Jewel agrees with this principle in *Violence and Aggression in Sporting Contests*, writing that sporting events (football, in particular) and alcohol, when combined, “create a rather combustible situation.”¹⁹⁵ In contrast, a study of hooligans determined this point to be false, arguing that although alcohol may have been involved in some cases, not all hooligans drink or excessively drink.¹⁹⁶ The same can be said for college students involved in sports riots. The Ohio State Task Force concludes, “Alcohol certainly contributes to celebratory riots, but it does not necessarily cause them.”¹⁹⁷ While none of these non-behavioral traits offer conclusive reasons for sports riot, each is commonly seen in the case studies, causing many to reach false conclusions about their involvement. A deeper examination in behavioral traits of the crowd provides more concrete reasoning.

¹⁹¹ Miranda, 2001 *NCAA Championship Deployment*, 15.

¹⁹² Lewis, *Sports Fan Violence in North America*, 62.

¹⁹³ Timothy W. Friedman, Stephen R. Robinson, and Gregory W. Yelland, “Impaired Perceptual Judgment at Low Blood Alcohol Concentrations,” *Alcohol* 45, no. 7 (2011): 711–718.

¹⁹⁴ This study used for this conclusion was a study about men and women using alcohol and their judgment associated to sexual encounters. It concluded that drinking resulting in a higher likelihood of consent to sex than non-drinkers. Barbara C. Leigh, and Beatriz Aramburu, “The Role of Alcohol and Gender in Choices and Judgments about Hypothetical Sexual Encounters,” *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 26, no. 1 (1996): 20–30.

¹⁹⁵ Jewell, *Violence and Aggression in Sporting Contests*, 178.

¹⁹⁶ Dunning, Murphy, and Williams, “Spectator Violence at Football Matches,” 225.

¹⁹⁷ Task Force on Preventing Celebratory Riots, *The Ohio State University*, 35.

J. SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY

When people crowd into a stadium to support the home team, individual fans instantly connect to a common purpose. For instance, following the 1997 Men's Basketball National Championship, one student told a reporter, "I've never seen so much school spirit in my life. This makes all the hard years at school worth it."¹⁹⁸ Fans all wearing the same genre of team colors and supporting their team create a level of connection. The social identity theory defines a social group as "two or more individuals who share a common social identification of themselves... [and] perceive themselves to be members of the same social category."¹⁹⁹ Membership into a group can be formal or informal, such as the case with sports fans. There are no social contracts, membership dues, or special privileges; however, members still create cohesion through the perception of belonging.²⁰⁰ Additionally, social identity theory establishes that members of the group immediately begin inflating the value of their group (in-group) and diminishing the value of opposing groups (out-groups), thus creating out-group discrimination.²⁰¹ The development of social identity includes three distinct phases: social categorization, social identification, and social comparison.²⁰²

K. SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION

Social categorization is the human tendency to quickly assess and categorize others.²⁰³ Generally, when people think of membership into a group, it implies a club, civil group, a business, or some other formal institution. Group membership during sporting events lacks the formality of rules²⁰⁴ and as such is defined more through interpersonal associations. In the context of sporting events, the cognitive membership into the group begins with favoring one team over another. This places an individual into

¹⁹⁸ Lima, Brown, and Hernandez, "Loud, Naked, Drunken Fans Storm Tucson."

¹⁹⁹ Tajfel, *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*, 15.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., 23.

²⁰¹ Ibid., 34.

²⁰² Tajfel, *Differentiation between Social Groups*, 61.

²⁰³ Tajfel, *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*, 28.

²⁰⁴ Reeves, *The Dynamics of Group Behavior*, 97.

a specific and separate membership, although separate subgroups may also develop within the main group. McPhail and Wohlstein refer to growing data suggesting that people tend to remain in subgroups with people they know, even after they join larger groups.²⁰⁵ In the context of sporting events, categorization begins when fans wear team colors to show support,²⁰⁶ but it also includes more complex behavior, such as the need to be near those with similar membership.

L. SOCIAL IDENTIFICATION

Social identification is an evaluation that occurs when members strongly and overtly identify with the group through primarily a perceptual or cognitive basis,²⁰⁷ which can strengthen or weaken an individual's membership. Simply wearing team colors begins the process of identifying with the in-group, but acceptance into the group requires a deeper commitment from the individual and acceptance by the group. Membership into a group has a very strong draw, according to Elton Reeves. He states, "membership into a chosen group is essential to the peace of mind of any man. He will set aside other consideration, except the most basic economic ones, until he's been accepted by the group."²⁰⁸ In addition, Tajfel and Turner explain:

Where the ingroup lacks positive distinctiveness, member will be motivated either to leave that group physically, or dissociate themselves from it psychologically and aspire to membership of a higher status group or to adopt a creative and/or competitive strategies to restore its positive distinctiveness.²⁰⁹

Moreover, John Lofland describes that individuals within a group constantly evaluate their "purposive action" to determine whether they have reached the goal or

²⁰⁵ Clark McPhail, and Ronald T. Wohlstein, "Individual and Collective Behaviors during Riots," *Annual Reviews Sociology*, no. 9 (1983): 594.

²⁰⁶ News article denoting that 2,500 fans turned out to greet the University of Arizona Men's Basketball Team while mostly wearing red apparel. Associated Press, "Police Clash with Rioting Arizona Fans," *ESPN*, April 3, 2001 <http://assets.espn.go.com/ncb/ncaatourney01/news/2001/0403/1166585.html>.

²⁰⁷ Tajfel, *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*, 16.

²⁰⁸ Reeves, *The Dynamics of Group Behavior*, 91.

²⁰⁹ Tajfel, *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*, 34.

not.²¹⁰ It is important to note that the group itself defines the group's "positive identity," so it does not necessarily imply morally or socially positive. For example, members of "hate groups" define their memberships by the same measurements as any other group,²¹¹ although the identity and purpose is significantly different. Equally important is the notion that individuals may have different motivations for being in the group.²¹² This was evident in during the 1999 WTO protest in Seattle where some protestors complained about the motivations of others.²¹³ The search for positive identity may not occur instantly. Following a sporting event, crowds are witnessed to be standing around waiting for the something to happen, a trait known by some scholars as *milling*.

M. MILLING

Hogg and Tinsdale describe process of milling as "people engag[ing] with each other, proffering their own account of reality and listening to others. Preceding a violent event, there may have been a prolonged period of 'hang around' where members seek to make sense of what is happening."²¹⁴ An identifying component within the milling stages is people searching for purpose within the groups by asking of questions or determining the certainty of an event.²¹⁵ Blumer describes the observable trait of milling as people "standing or walking around, even talking about the exiting event."²¹⁶ Figure 6 gives an elevated perspective of University of Wisconsin students centralizing and milling in the streets following the men's basketball team's Elite Eight victory over the University of Arizona.

²¹⁰ McPhail, *The Myth of the Madding Crowd*, 141.

²¹¹ David Brannan, Kristin Darken, and Anders Strindberg, *A Practitioner's Way Forward* (Williams, CA: Agile Press, 2014), 68.

²¹² Ibid., 70.

²¹³ Doyle, "Anatomy of a Riot."

²¹⁴ Michael A Hogg, and R. Scott Tindale, eds., *Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology Group Process* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 192–193.

²¹⁵ McPhail, *The Myth of the Madding Crowd*, 79.

²¹⁶ Ibid., 11.

Figure 6. Students Milling Following a 2015 Elite Eight Victory



Source: "Photo: Fans Celebrate in Streets of Madison, Wis., after University Basketball Team Moves on to Final Four in NCAA Tournaments@Macy_Oswald," *Breaking News*, March 30, 2014, <http://www.breakingnews.com/item/2014/03/30/photo-fan>.

N. SOCIAL COMPARISON

Social comparison measures attributes, comparing a person's group (in-group) to another group (out-group) based on the emotional attachment to the in-group or dislike of the out-group. This comparison either strengthens the cohesion of the group or causes the members to reevaluate in favor of another group. In order to build and maintain cohesion, leaders must continually provide the group with its positive identity. Michael Hogg explains, "social identity is self-evaluative and derives its value from the evaluative properties of the in-group, social comparisons between groups are focused on establishing evaluatively positive distinctiveness for one's own group."²¹⁷ This evolutionary process tends to exaggerate people in the in-group and minimize those in the out-group.²¹⁸

To better identify this process of socialization, analytical markers may be used to highlight key components of the group development. These markers were taken from

²¹⁷ Michael A Hogg, "A Social Identity Theory of Leadership," *Personality & Social Psychology Review* 5, no. 3 (2001): 186.

²¹⁸ Moghaddam, "The Psychology of Fear."

research on Mediterranean cultures and applied to the social identity theory by Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg.²¹⁹ When applied to behavioral traits commonly seen in sports riot, these markers may help police commanders determine and possibly predict the changing moods of a group. The markers are:

- Patron-client relationship
- Honor/shame paradigm
- Limited good
- Challenge response cycle²²⁰

1. Patron-Client Relationship

In traditional patron-client situations, this would be the relationship between a protective actor (patron), such as a state actor and the individuals (clients) who depend on the patron for protection.²²¹ In the case of a sports riot, the students become the clients and the patron becomes the group itself.

2. Honor/Shame

The honor of the group defines the worth or status of the group and the members.²²² A lack of status may result in the members finding a new group. Honor comes in the form intergroup interaction (within the members of the group) and outer group interaction (with member of the out-group). Additionally, honor generally comes in a series of challenges. Police identify these challenges as traits (discussed later in this chapter).²²³

²¹⁹ Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, *A Practitioner's Way Forward*, 84; Also see, Jean G. Peristiany, ed. *Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965); Julian Rivers-Pitt, *The People of the Sierra*, 2nd ed., Vol. 55 (London: University of Chicago Press, 1971); John K. Campbell, *Honour, Family and Patronage* (Oxford University Press, 1974); Michael Herzfeld, "Honor and Shame: Problems in the Comparative Analysis of Moral Systems," *Man* 15 (1980): 339–351; Bruce J. Malina, *The New Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology* (Westminster: John Knox Press, 2001).

²²⁰ Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, *A Practitioner's Way Forward*, 84.

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² David Brannan, and Anders Strindberg, "Social Identity Theory Module II: What Is Social Identity Theory?" Internal online document; website not publically accessible.

²²³ Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, *A Practitioner's Way Forward*, 86.

3. Limited Good

Limited good is the notion that “social, economic, and natural resources exist only in limited quantity and always in short supply.”²²⁴ A limited good is generally seen as a resource, real estate for example, but may also be a group’s honor also.²²⁵ In all cases, limited good is a zero sum-game, one in which only one group can possess the good.²²⁶ In a sports riot, the intersection of the street becomes the disputed property, and the group existence becomes challenged when the police attempt to disperse the crowd.

4. Challenge/Response Cycle

The challenge/response cycle is the interaction between the in-group and out-group through a series of challenges and responses.²²⁷ The behavior of a crowd has been described in various reports as “changing” at a certain point throughout the night.²²⁸ This change may be as a result of a challenge/response cycle, where the in-group (in this case, the students) begins testing itself and testing the out-group (the police). Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg describe the challenge/response cycle as having three components: the challenge (an action or statement on the part of the group), perception (how this challenge is perceived by the in-group and by the out-group), and the response (the challenged groups reaction and the public’s perception of this response).²²⁹ As discussed later in the chapter, the perception of this challenge by the groups incites others to act defiantly against the police, who were attempting to clear the street. As the identity of the group develops, two factors influence members of the group into lashing out: group empowerment and anonymity within the group.

²²⁴ Ibid., 93.

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ Brannan, and Strindberg, “Social Identity Theory Module II.”

²²⁷ Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, *A Practitioner’s Way Forward*, 86.

²²⁸ Miranda, *2001 NCAA Championship Deployment*, 16.

²²⁹ Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, *A Practitioner’s Way Forward*, 96.

5. Anonymity

As the crowd grows, the police tend to move away from the center into surrounding position where they can join together for safety and watch for criminal behavior.²³⁰ This lack of direct contact creates conditions of anonymity within the center of the crowd. The power of numbers makes members within the group feel stronger than the opposing group, which, in this case, may be police officers standing nearby. Philip Zimbardo refers to this as the “power elite” when discussing what makes good people turn bad when placed into a position of power over another.²³¹ Anonymity within the group adds to the perceived power by removing culpability or the fear of being caught. Le Bon addresses this in his original transformational theory by claiming that individuals shed normal restraints that extend to the group due to anonymity.²³² Other experiments, such as ones with children’s behavior on Halloween, also support that anonymity is a strong force within a group setting.²³³ This suggests that anonymity alters behavior in a way that would not normally exist. Tajfel disagrees, saying that since people in groups are known to others in the group, the state of anonymity only applies to outsiders.²³⁴ For example, they identified growing data suggesting that people tend to remain in subgroups with people they know, even after they join larger groups.²³⁵ As social norms allow aggressive behavior in group settings, such as sports riots, anonymity strips the actor of the last social control mechanism by reducing the fear of discipline. In a study about police and riots, Thomas Kitch wrote,

Many people saw that we [police] were unable to do anything, and then began to loot themselves. A police officer is not going into a crowd of 50

²³⁰ Miranda, 2001 NCAA Championship Deployment (video evidence).

²³¹ Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect*, 10.

²³² McPhail, *The Myth of the Madding Crowd*, 3.

²³³ A study of de-individualization caused by anonymity. The original study was performed by Ed Diener et al. in “Effects of Deindividualization Variables on Stealing among Halloween Trick-or-Treaters” quoted in Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect*, 302.

²³⁴ Tajfel, *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*, 51.

²³⁵ McPhail, and Wohlstein, “Individual and Collective Behaviors during Riots,” 594.

to 100 people alone if he is afraid to use the force necessary to stop looting and also to protect his own life.²³⁶

LAPD Deputy Chief Patrick Gannon addressed this issue in the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) when he stated, “crowds celebrating a sporting event are different from political demonstrators. You need to be proactive. If you just line up police officers as a wall against the crowd during a sports celebration, you’re going to have problems.”²³⁷ Conditions of anonymity set the tone for the next condition: group empowerment.

6. Group Empowerment

At this point, individuals within the group begin experimenting with anonymity by testing the group and the police, who are standing by watching or cannot see into the group at all due to the number of students. As previously discussed, the challenge/response cycle is seen as a series of tests that the in-group presents to the out-group.²³⁸ In this setting, these tests are initially presented as morally unacceptable acts and eventually escalate to illegal acts. Police recognize these challenges as “triggers” or traits that suggest a riot is pending.²³⁹ For example, shouldering is the concept of people, usually women, climbing on the shoulders of men to get a better view of the action within the group. As the group builds energy, chants from the group encourage the women to expose themselves to the crowd. Under normal circumstances, merely asking women to do this is an unacceptable practice; however, anonymity sheds the individual of the moral restriction. As the crowd reacts to the shouldered women in cheers and encouragement, some women react by fulfilling the request, even understanding the repercussions (self-degradation and possibility of arrest). Freud explains this concept of *getting caught up in the moment* as an act of contagion when he wrote, “in a group every sentiment and act is

²³⁶ Kitch, “Police Perception of Riot Activity,” 124.

²³⁷ Patrick Gannon, *Managing Major Events: Best Practices from the Field*, Police Executive Research Forum, 2011, http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series/managing%20major%20events%20-%20best%20practices%20from%20the%20field%202011.pdf, 14, 15.

²³⁸ Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, *A Practitioner’s Way Forward*, 86.

²³⁹ Miranda, *2001 NCAA Championship Deployment*, 34–35.

contagious, and contagious to such a degree that an individual readily sacrifices his personal interest to the collective interest.”²⁴⁰

A number of common behavior traits are seen as groups develop cohesion (see Figure 7). Providing the proper context for the traits is imperative for correct interpretation. Police departments commonly focus on several different easily identifiable traits but may misinterpret what they actually indicate. For example, behaviors such as “fighting or throwing objects” may lead to the “police to take enforcement action,”²⁴¹ even though the trigger may not influence a particular crowd response.²⁴² For example, while it is true that a single fight seldom results in a riot, a single fight *among other behaviors* may result in an escalation of behaviors resulting in riotous conditions. Clark McPhail identified this trait as “surging.”²⁴³ Rather than saying that Person A fighting leads to X condition, McPhail simply identifies fighting as a commonly seen trait of common velocity within a crowd. Surging may end in a fight, but he focuses more on the crowd behavior than individual traits within the crowd.²⁴⁴

²⁴⁰ Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, Kindle locations 110–111.


²⁴¹ Miranda, *2001 NCAA Championship Deployment*, 34.

²⁴² Ibid., 35.

²⁴³ McPhail, *The Myth of the Madding Crowd*, 169.

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

Figure 7. Commonly Seen Traits during a Sports Riot



The first honor challenge occurs when the students centralize in the street. Under normal circumstances, standing in the middle of an intersection or rushing the field is prohibited by law; however, this occurs regularly as a result of students centralizing in the streets following a sporting event. This location also becomes the limited good, since it is a place controlled by the police, taken by the students, only to be retaken by the police.²⁴⁵ Chanting is one of the more common traits observed when the students first centralize. Referred to a “collective verbalization,”²⁴⁶ the act stands for more than simply cheering for one’s team. Researchers have shown that the escalation of tones and synchronization of words has an emotional component that brings people together.²⁴⁷ Chanting for a team is common in the beginning stages of a crowd developing identity. While some studies suggest that the noise itself increases aggression,²⁴⁸ others suggest

²⁴⁵ Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, *A Practitioner’s Way Forward*, 93.

²⁴⁶ McPhail, *The Myth of the Madding Crowd*, 164.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., 166.

²⁴⁸ Russell, *Aggression in the Sports World*, 78.

that chanting, in combination with other nonverbal cues, such as clinching the fist, is a display of solidarity and power.²⁴⁹ Students chant positive phrases in unison, such as “U of A,”²⁵⁰ but depending on the mood of the crowd, phrases can quickly turn negative. For instance, in 2001, Arizona students quickly began chanting “Fuck Duke,”²⁵¹ as they did in 2014 and again in 2015 after losing to Wisconsin.²⁵² These acts may seem benign; however, both are social infractions (or illegal) and have a psychological impact on the students. Gordon Russell suggests in his book, *Aggression in the Sports World*, “Negatively toned interpretations [of songs and chants] may prompt a stronger than usual aggressive response to an individual, therefore setting the stage for an upward spiral of increasingly antisocial exchanges.”²⁵³ There may be a delinquency impact of angry chants, also. The act of standing in the street is a mildly delinquent act and under normal conditions would be socially rejected. However, as discussed previously, social norms are incrementally changed. This delinquent act involves an impersonal object and has a clear separation from serious delinquency where an interpersonal relation may exist, such as assault or arson.²⁵⁴

Each individual action that goes unchallenged by authorities adds to the group cohesion and encourages additional challenges, which quickly push into unlawful acts. Commonly seen behaviors at this stage include:

- Shouldering
- Flashing
- Climbing
- Street lights and street signs
- Pyrotechnics

²⁴⁹ McPhail, *The Myth of the Madding Crowd*, 167.

²⁵⁰ Miranda, *2001 NCAA Championship Deployment*, 14.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

²⁵² Jazmine Foster-Hall, “Fans Riot on University Boulevard after Elite Eight Loss,” *Arizona Wildcat*, March 30, 2014, <http://www.wildcat.arizona.edu/article/2014/03/fans-riot-on-university-boulevard-after-elite-eight-loss>.

²⁵³ Russell, *Aggression in the Sports World*, 32–33.

²⁵⁴ John Finley Scott, “Two Dimensions of Delinquent Behavior,” *American Sociological Review* 24, no. 2 (1959): 242.

- Smoke bombs
- Fireworks²⁵⁵

Escalation to aggravated levels of behavior strongly depends on the group's acceptance of the previous behavior. Tajfel and Turner describe this process as having three components:

A cognitive component, in the sense to the knowledge that one belongs to a group; an evaluative one, in the sense that the notion of the group and/or one's membership may have a positive or negative value connotation; and an emotional component in the sense that the cognitive and evaluative aspects of the group and one's membership of it may be accompanied by emotion directed toward one's own group...²⁵⁶

If the group encourages the behavior by circularing,²⁵⁷ chanting, and increasing energy, the behaviors will escalate; however, individuals within the group could also reject behavior. This may occur when the group cohesion has not risen to a level where the norms haven't anchored, or when members reject the purpose of the group.²⁵⁸ If the members find positive value through the challenges, cohesion continues to build to the point that criminal behavior is an acceptable practice, including violence within the group and focused on out-groups.²⁵⁹ Other examples of behavioral traits include:

- Minor vandalism (to street signs and streetlights).
- Mosh pits—violent dancing
- Minor arson
 - Small fires
 - Burning couches²⁶⁰

²⁵⁵ This list was developed through examinations of news articles, and the case studies featured in this thesis.

²⁵⁶ Tajfel, *Differentiation between Social Groups*, 28.

²⁵⁷ Circularing occurs when individuals converge and focus on a particular stimulus, such two people fighting within a group. McPhail refers to this concept as arcing or ringing. See McPhail, *The Myth of the Madding Crowd*, 165.

²⁵⁸ Tajfel, *Differentiation between Social Groups*, 64.

²⁵⁹ Ibid.

²⁶⁰ This list was developed through examinations of news articles, and the case studies featured in this thesis.

7. The Out-Group

As previously discussed, the grouping tendency within the social categorization creates distinctions between groups.²⁶¹ Curiously, Tajfel and Turner use the particular phrase, “us and they” to describe this social division.²⁶² Police have used a similar term to describe a condition where the police create an adversarial connection with the community.²⁶³ While the students continue to develop their identity as a cohesive group, the police identity has already been developed. This occurs through police socialization, which begins in the academy and continues throughout an officer’s career.²⁶⁴ Tajfel and Turner describe identity as “self-concept which derives from ...knowledge of...membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership.”²⁶⁵ Membership to the police department is formal, structured, and exclusive. Furthermore, it strengthens as a result of shared experiences among officers.²⁶⁶ It also represents a completely different set of values than the student population.

From the point the game ends and the students centralize in the streets, social identification occurs; however, until an in-group/out-group conflict occurs, the relationship remains amicable. Once a dispute over a limited good occurs, the conflict grows. Chapter IV will apply several case studies to the two social theories to show how social norming and social identity influence behavior surrounding sporting events.

²⁶¹ Tajfel, *Differentiation between Social Groups*, 62.

²⁶² Ibid.

²⁶³ This phrase is commonly used in law enforcement to denote a separation between the police and the community, although its origination is unknown.

²⁶⁴ John van Maanen, and Edgar H. Schein, “Toward a Theory of Organizational Socialization,” *Research in Organizational Behavior* 1 (January 1979): 209–211.

²⁶⁵ Tajfel, *Differentiation between Social Groups*, 63.

²⁶⁶ Matthew D. Hanley, “Killing Barney Fife: Law Enforcement’s Socially Constructed Perception of Violence and Its Influence on Police Militarization” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015), 61–62.

IV. CASE STUDIES

Serious sport has nothing to do with fair play. It is bound up with hatred, jealousy, boastfulness, disregard of all rules, and sadistic pleasure in witnessing violence: in other words, it is war without the shooting.

— George Orwell, *Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*

The case studies supporting the hypothesis is limited to college basketball sporting events primarily at the University of Arizona in 1997, 2001, 2014 (twice), and 2015, where the men's basketball team advanced to at least the quarterfinal round (Elite 8). Other incidents studied include the University of Wisconsin, University of Florida, University of Kentucky, and University of Connecticut, although the information is limited. Newspaper articles and other research also provide data supporting the case studies where details may be missing. The case studies are categorized into three segments, conditions, normalization stage, and social identity stage, rather than by the year of the event. Each of the events are presented by the year of occurrence: 1997, 2001, 2014, and 2015. The chapter begins with an explanation of the variables that affect events, but it falls short of providing a definitive cause of the behavior. Finally, the chapter concludes with examples of grouping behavior modeled by the social identity theory.

A. TYPES OF EVENTS

Since each case study is a sporting event, they will all be classified as a non-social change based event, as defined in Chapter III. These events lack an underlying desire to change some social component. Additionally, the sporting events are all NCAA men's basketball games leading up the championship game. The phrase "Sweet Sixteen" refers the point in the tournament where only 16 teams remain in the single elimination format.

“Elite Eight” refers to the final eight teams, and “Final Four” refers to the last four teams.²⁶⁷

B. GEOGRAPHIC COMPARISONS

The data for the geographic comparison is comprised of the teams represented in the 2014 NCAA Men’s Basketball Championship (Kentucky, Connecticut, Florida, and Wisconsin), plus the University of Arizona. The purpose of this comparison is to show city population, student enrollment, size of police departments, and type of police training discover any patterns.

The University of Arizona is located in the Tucson, Arizona. The population within the city limits is 527,792²⁶⁸ and approximately one million when including the surrounding county.²⁶⁹ The University of Arizona averages total population of about 40,000 students per year, an average tuition of \$10,400 in-state, and \$27,400 out-of-state.²⁷⁰ Due to the history of sports riots, the student bar districts are policed by the Tucson Police Department, the University of Arizona Police Department, the Arizona Department of Public Safety, and the Pima County Sheriffs Department. The Tucson Police Department has primary jurisdiction over the area. The University of Arizona basketball team experienced sports riots in 1997, 2001, and 2014 (twice). In 2015, there were no student riots.

²⁶⁷ The terms Sweet Sixteen, Elite Eight, and Final Four are trademarked by the NCAA and the Illinois High School Association through a joint venture named the March Madness Athletic Association. “NCAA Dominates Ownership of Such Familiar Terms as ‘March Madness,’ ‘Sweet Sixteen,’ ‘Elite Eight,’ ‘Final Four,’” accessed November 24, 2015, <http://www.ibj.com/articles/2204-ncaa-dominates-ownership-of-such-familiar-terms-as-march-madness-sweet-sixteen-elite-eight-final-four>.

²⁶⁸ Data derived from “Population Estimates, American Community Survey, Census of Population and Housing, County Business Patterns, Economic Census, Survey of Business Owners, Building Permits, Census of Governments,” U.S. Census Bureau: State and County QuickFacts, May 28, 2015, accessed May 28, 2015, http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml. Taken from 2014 estimations.

²⁶⁹ Data derived from “Population Estimates, American Community Survey, Census of Population and Housing, State and County Housing Unit Estimates, County Business Patterns, Nonemployer Statistics, Economic Census, Survey of Business Owners, Building Permits, accessed May 28, 2015, U.S. Census Bureau: State and County QuickFacts, http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml#none. Taken from 2014 estimations.

²⁷⁰ JT Turner, “2014 NCAA Elite 8 Game: Tucson Police Department, City Visits Debriefing,” presented at the NCAA Elite 8 Debriefing, Tucson, AZ, April 2014.

University of Florida is located in Gainesville, Florida—46 square miles and home to 125,000 permanent residents. The University of Florida adds an additional 60,000 to the total population from students living in Gainesville area. The Gainesville Police Department employs 300 sworn officers and a command staff comprised of a police chief, a major, and three captains. The University of Florida Police Department has 90 sworn officers, a police chief, and two majors.²⁷¹ For the last 20 years, neither department trains its officers in mobile field force (MFF) tactics.²⁷²

University of Wisconsin, located in Madison, Wisconsin, has 240,323 permanent residences in the city limits, and 568,593 of them live in the metropolitan area. In addition, the university has a student population of 42,000. The Madison Police Department (MPD) has 443 sworn officers. During Final Four preparations, MPD is assisted by Wisconsin University Police Department, Dane County Sheriff's Department, the Wisconsin State Police, and the Wisconsin Capital Police..²⁷³

The University of Kentucky, located in Lexington, Kentucky has 29,000 students, and there are 300,000 permanent residents in the surrounding area. With 540 sworn officers covering 280 square miles of territory, the Lexington Police Department is the largest of the previously listed departments.²⁷⁴

The University of Connecticut (UConn) is located in Storrs, Connecticut. It is a small community by comparison to the other locations with about 25,000 permanent residents. UConn enrolls 25,000 students annually. The University of Connecticut Police Department has primary jurisdiction and 76 sworn officers, and the Connecticut State Police, with 27 sworn officers, assist them.²⁷⁵ Table 3 compares the five different college campuses relating to the size of the department, the size of the city, the student population for each school, and number of officers used in the 2014 NCAA Final Four.

²⁷¹ Ibid.

²⁷² MFF is a common name for units trained specifically for quelling riots.

²⁷³ Turner, “2014 NCAA Elite 8 Game.”

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

The purpose of this data is to show visually how each differs in population, department size, and preparation for the NCAA men's basketball tournament.

Table 3. 2014 Men's Basketball Final Four Universities

School	Student Population	Community Population	Total number of officers	Special preparations?
University of Florida	60,000	125,000	390	No
University of Wisconsin	42,000	240,000–569,000	443 ²⁷⁶	Year-around training, but no specific NCAA training.
University of Kentucky	29,000	300,000	540	No
University of Connecticut	25,000	25,000	105	No
University of Arizona	40,000	524,000–1,000,000	140 ²⁷⁷	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MFF training • Operations plan • Pre-exercises

Source: Turner, "2014 NCAA Elite 8 Game."

Table 4 is a comparison of strategies used by the different cities. All five schools used mitigation methods²⁷⁸ to reduce potential damage and injury during the 2014 NCAA tournament. Three of the five schools have a history of clashes between students

²⁷⁶ The operation is supplemented with other officers from outside agencies. The exact number was not provided.

²⁷⁷ This number denotes the number of officers used in the NCAA tournament, not the total number of officers available. Allen, Leavitt, and Roberts, *Board of Inquiry, 2014 NCAA Championship Deployment*, 4.

²⁷⁸ Mitigation strategies in this context refer to mandatory clearing of vehicles from streets in the affected areas, removing burnable items (couches, trashcans, etc.), and removing possible projectiles. This also means contacting the local businesses to establish common rules and practices to reduce the chance of damage and violence.

and police. Only the University of Arizona specifically trains for NCAA Championship related disturbances; however, this school has had a high comparative number of sports related riots directly related to the NCAA men's basketball tournament since the mid-1990s. The initial expectation of this comparison was see how police preparation, history of incidents at the schools, or a lack of mitigation affected the potential for violence; however, there is no clear pattern.

Table 4. 2014 NCAA Men's Basketball Strategic Comparison

School	Special Training	Mitigation Strategy	Normal Celebration	Prior History?	Clash with Police?	Arrests/Injuries
University of Florida	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	0/0
University of Wisconsin	No specific NCAA training	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	10/0
University of Kentucky	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	0/0
University of Connecticut	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	0/0
University of Arizona	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MFF training • Operations plan • Pre-exercises 	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	15/3

Source: Turner, "2014 NCAA Elite 8 Game."

Table 5 shows a comparative history of the number of appearances by each school at the NCAA men's basketball tournament as well as which games ended in a sports riot between 1997 and 2015. The comparison shows that riots do not occur at all of the schools that were studied.

Table 5. NCAA Appearances versus Riot Comparison

School	NCAA Appearance	Final Game in Appearance	Riot Following Game
University of Florida ²⁷⁹	1999	Lost in Final Four	No
	2000	Lost in championship	No
	2006	Won championship	No
	2007	Won championship	No
	2011	Lost in Elite 8	No
	2012	Lost in Elite 8	No
	2013	Lost in Elite 8	No
	2014	Lost in Final 4	No
University of Wisconsin ²⁸⁰	2000	Lost in Final 4	No
	2005	Lost in Elite 8	No
	2014	Lost in Final 4	No ²⁸¹
	2015	Lost in championship	No
University of Kentucky ²⁸²	1997	Lost in championship	No
	1998	Won championship	No
	1999	Lost in Elite 8	No
	2003	Lost in Elite 8	No
	2005	Lost in Elite 8	No
	2010	Lost in Elite 8	No
	2011	Lost in Final 4	No

²⁷⁹ ‘NCAA Basketball Tournament History: Florida Gators,’ *ESPN*, accessed August 24, 2015, http://espn.go.com/mens-college-basketball/tournament/history/_team1/5987.

²⁸⁰ ‘NCAA Basketball Tournament History: Wisconsin Badgers,’ *ESPN*, accessed August 24, 2015, http://espn.go.com/mens-college-basketball/tournament/history/_team1/8023.

²⁸¹ For 2014 and 2015, a detailed email to this author by Captain Thomas Snyder, Madison Police Department, which described students’ behavior as similar to that described in this thesis. However, each incident was isolated, and none resulted in large clashes with police.

²⁸² ‘NCAA Basketball Tournament History: Kentucky Wildcats,’ *ESPN*, accessed August 24, 2015, http://espn.go.com/mens-college-basketball/tournament/history/_team1/6313.

School	NCAA Appearance	Final Game in Appearance	Riot Following Game
	2012	Won championship	Yes
	2014	Lost in championship	Yes
	2015	Lost in Final 4	Yes
University of Connecticut ²⁸³	1999	Won championship	No
	2004	Won championship	Yes
	2011	Won championship	Yes
	2014	Won championship	Yes
University of Arizona ²⁸⁴	1997	Won championship	Yes
	2001	Lost championship	Yes
	2003	Lost in Elite 8	No
	2011	Lost in Elite 8	No
	2014	Won Sweet 16	Yes
	2014	Lost Elite 8	Yes
	2015	Lost Elite 8	No

C. UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA AREA ANALYSIS

In April 1997, the University of Arizona Men's Basketball team played in its first national championship game against the University of Kentucky. The energy leading up to the game was captured in newspapers and television coverage throughout the tournament. In 1997 and 2001, the 4th Avenue bar districts in Tucson drew the largest fan base for watching the game due to the proximity to University of Arizona campus,²⁸⁵

²⁸³ "NCAA Basketball Tournament History: Connecticut Huskies," *ESPN*, accessed August 24, 2015, http://espn.go.com/mens-college-basketball/tournament/history/_/team1/7721.

²⁸⁴ "NCAA Basketball Tournament History: Arizona Wildcats," *ESPN*, accessed August 24, 2015, http://espn.go.com/mens-college-basketball/tournament/history/_/team1/5229.

²⁸⁵ Danaher, *1997 NCAA Championship Game after Action Report*.

although other areas presented a concern and required policing.²⁸⁶ The 4th Avenue bar district hosts a cluster of bars that primarily attract students (see Figure 8).

Figure 8. 4th Avenue Area near the University of Arizona




Image generated from Apple Maps program.

The area has bars on both sides of the street, and there is a streetcar running through the entire district. This presented safety challenges for the police when preparing for the 1997 and 2001 championship games.²⁸⁷

In 2014 and 2015, a surge in businesses in the Main Street Square business district, as well as new student housing, changed the focal point of the celebratory

²⁸⁶ Deposition of Robinson, Bouley, Schlesinger, and Schippers (State of Arizona Superior Court 2003). Robinson spoke of being concerned about several college bars surrounding the University of Arizona. Jeffrey Knepper vs. the City of Tucson No. 22001 5008 (2003).

²⁸⁷ Danaher, *1997 NCAA Championship Game after Action Report*.

activity. Similar to the 4th Avenue area, Main Street Square is surrounded by bars on both sides, and it has the new Modern Street Car running through the middle. This area is significantly closer to the university, making it more accessible to students. There is also a residential neighborhood to the west (see Figure 9).

Figure 9. Main Street Square near the University of Arizona




Image generated from Apple Maps program.

1. Conditions

Three common variables discussed in Chapter III, centralization, game importance, and game intensity, were present during each year studied. Centralization is a physical condition, and will be discussed throughout the rest of the chapter. Game importance rests on the finality of the game and the expectations of the fans. For example, in 1997, Arizona was viewed as an underdog throughout much of the tournament.²⁸⁸ Following each subsequent victory, the expectations for Arizona to achieve a national championship increased.²⁸⁹ Fans told reporters of their difficulties

²⁸⁸ Tim Kawakami, "Underdog Role Nothing New to Optimistic Young Wildcats," *Los Angeles Times*, March 29, 1997.

²⁸⁹ Javier Morales, "It's All Wildcats: Win Gets UA to Seasons' Ultimate Goal," *Arizona Daily Star*, March 30, 1997.

getting to this point, of their struggles, and of how “everyone underestimated us.”²⁹⁰ A newspaper article the morning after the championship game captured the intensity of the game when a student said, “I’ve never felt like I had 30,000 family members, but last night on Fourth Avenue it was like one big family party. I’ve never given more high-fives and hugs to people that I have never met.”²⁹¹ The intensity of the game itself added to this energy. With the 1997 championship game tied at half time, the energy of the crowd had already built to a feverish pitch; fans throwing ice buckets at each other to celebrate the comeback.²⁹² As the game concluded, “fans threw chairs and sprayed each other with beer as the overtime period ended and the Wildcats’ victory was made official.”²⁹³

In 2001, Arizona was no longer an underdog, but some still questioned whether it could win against more accomplished basketball programs, such as Michigan State.²⁹⁴ The intensity increased during the championship game against favored Duke, when frustrated fans blamed referees and television personalities announcing the game of having “east coast bias.”²⁹⁵ The 2014 Elite Eight quarterfinal game ended in a one-point overtime loss to Wisconsin, with teams changing leads throughout the contest.²⁹⁶ The 2015 rematch between Wisconsin and Arizona had the making of a very intense game; however, Wisconsin built and held a 10-point lead through much of the second half.²⁹⁷

²⁹⁰ Danaher, *1997 NCAA Championship Game after Action Report*.

²⁹¹ Craig Degel, “Anyone Not on 4th Ave. Last Night?” *Arizona Daily Wildcat*, April 1, 1997. This article was included in the Tucson Police Department 1997 after action report to highlight the media attention.

²⁹² Lima, Brown, and Hernandez, “Loud, Naked, Drunken Fans Storm Tucson.”

²⁹³ Ibid.

²⁹³ Joseph Altman Jr., and Ana A. Lima, “Police Put a Premature Halt on the Post-Game Pandemonium,” *Arizona Daily Wildcat*, April 1997.

²⁹³ Danaher, *1997 NCAA Championship Game after Action Report*.

²⁹⁴ “Slurring the Wildcats,” *Arizona Daily Star*, April 3, 2001.

²⁹⁵ Dave Eubank, “CBS Crew Was Fair during UA-Duke Finale, so Were Officials,” *Arizona Daily Star*, April 6, 2001.

²⁹⁶ “Wisconsin Beats No. 1 Arizona in OT Thriller,” *ESPN*, March 30, 2014, <http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/recap?gameId=400549675>.

²⁹⁷ “Arizona Wildcats vs. Wisconsin Badgers—NCAA Tournament Game—Play by Play,” *ESPN*, March 28, 2015, <http://scores.espn.go.com/ncb/playbyplay?gameId=400787578>.

2. Normalization

A previously discussed in Chapter III, social norming is a standardizing of behavior within a group.²⁹⁸ Prior to the 1997 championship game, Arizona had never experienced a sports riot; however, immediately following the game, thousands of students left the bar district on 4th Avenue and entered the streets to celebrate.²⁹⁹ This section discusses how social norming impacted the all five case studies at the University of Arizona.

a. 1997 and 2001

By 1997, riots following sporting event occurred with some regularity on a global level, including incidents in the United States. Hooliganism in the United Kingdom was gaining media attention following a series of violent clashes. Meanwhile, Game 5 of the 1984 World Series between the Detroit Tigers and the San Diego Padres grabbed national attention when the Tigers won their first championship in 16 years.³⁰⁰ The celebration turned violent when fans set fires, flipped cars, and looted businesses. The 1997 AAR mentions the how surprised the police were when the riot occurred.³⁰¹ In addition, it also discusses the importance of monitoring activities around the county for behaviors following events, such as a two-night riot in Boulder, Colorado over enforcement of liquor laws, a riot in Providence following an NCAA basketball game, a confrontation with the Klu Klux Klan (KKK) in Ohio, and an animal rights disturbance in Atlanta.³⁰² While these events differ from sports riots, they highlight how large events may spin into violent clashes between attendees and the police.

In 1997, social media was not as prevalent as today, and although available, cellular technology had still not hit the mass market.³⁰³ Mainstream media, however, had

²⁹⁸ Reeves, *The Dynamics of Group Behavior*, 110.

²⁹⁹ Danaher, *1997 NCAA Championship Game after Action Report*.

³⁰⁰ Thomas, “The Night the Detroit Tigers Won the 1984 World Series.”

³⁰¹ Danaher, *1997 NCAA Championship Game after Action Report*.

³⁰² Ibid.

³⁰³ Richard Wray, “In Just 25 Years, the Mobile Phone Has Transformed the Way We Communicate,” *The Guardian*, December 31, 2009, sec. Business.

“a major impact on the event”³⁰⁴ Local media allotted significant airtime to the Final Four, including commentary, player analysis, fan analysis, and eventually coverage of the game itself.³⁰⁵ While the 1997 AAR focuses mainly on strategy and tactics affecting the police, it also includes a number of newspaper articles that captured key points demonstrating that the students’ excitability was higher than the police may have anticipated.³⁰⁶ Once article quotes then Assistant Chief Richard Miranda as saying, “We never thought it would be this unruly.”³⁰⁷ While the same article quotes a student saying, “Everyone is going pretty ape shit! This is the way it’s supposed to be. I’d expect nothing less. Breaking lights, tipping over cars—I’d expect no less.”³⁰⁸ An editorial applauds the student’s ability to celebrate, saying:

A few people sustained minor injuries, an unmarked police car was destroyed, and a big mess was made. That is unfortunate and inexcusable. But it’s tame stuff compared with the violent scenes major cities have endured when their sports teams won big.³⁰⁹

Other articles, published prior to the championship, showed that fan excitement extended from the average student fan³¹⁰ all the way to the Arizona governor’s office.³¹¹ With fans describing the basketball fever as “greatest thing that’s ever happened to the University of Arizona” and “orgasmic,”³¹² the *Arizona Daily Star* felt compelled to print an article offering students and fans advice about how to cope with “superfan fanaticism.”³¹³

³⁰⁴ Danaher, *1997 NCAA Championship Game after Action Report*.

³⁰⁵ “Televised Offerings Abound as Cats Approach Final Four,” *Arizona Daily Star*, March 28, 1997.

³⁰⁶ Danaher, *1997 NCAA Championship Game after Action Report*.

³⁰⁷ Joseph Altman Jr., and Ana A. Lima, “Post-Game Madness Overwhelms Police,” *Arizona Daily Wildcat*, April 1, 1997.

³⁰⁸ Altman Jr., and Lima, “Post-Game Madness Overwhelms Police.” ³⁰⁹ Danaher, *1997 NCAA Championship Game after Action Report*.

³⁰⁹ Danaher, *1997 NCAA Championship Game after Action Report*.

³¹⁰ Jon Burstein, “Rumble of Cheers Rolls across Tucson from Fans,” *Arizona Daily Star*, April 3, 2001.

³¹¹ Shaun McKinnon, “Wildcat Fever Is Affecting Legislators,” *Arizona Daily Star*, March 28, 1997.

³¹² Burstein, “Rumble of Cheers Rolls across Tucson from Fans.”

³¹³ Doug Kreutz, “Superfan Fanaticism a Final Four Staple,” *Arizona Daily Star*, March 29, 1997.

The 2001 NCAA Men's Basketball National Championship between the University of Arizona and Duke University was less of a surprise to the Tucson police; they had more time to prepare than they did in 1997.³¹⁴ The early predication was that the 4th Avenue bar district would be the active area once again, similar to how it was in 1997. It was only four years since the 1997 riots, so members of the freshmen class could still be at school (possibly seniors) for the 2001 tournament.

The media coverage in 2001 was similar to 1997, with the exceptions of articles printing memories of the 1997 riots.³¹⁵ The pre-game environment was that of disrespect, highlighted by several newspaper articles. The fans also responded by purchasing large amounts of Arizona Wildcat fanfare in support of the team.³¹⁶ The night of the championship game, as the students moved into the 4th Avenue area, some had celebratory attitudes as indicated by high-fiving and taking photographs with the police. Other students were confrontational and challenging to the officers.³¹⁷

b. 2014 and 2015

By 2014, the ability for people to communicate transformed from mainstream media to social media, although the media continued to play an important role in reminding students about the 1997 and 2001 riots. An article in the *Arizona Daily Wildcat*, titled, “Police Prepare for Possible Riots over NCAA Championships,” gave students an explanation of the riotous history at Arizona, and included a photograph that offered more a celebratory feel (see Figure 10).³¹⁸

³¹⁴ Miranda, *2001 NCAA Championship Deployment*, 9.

³¹⁵ M. Scott Skinner, “Guard up by Police for Game Saturday—Parking, Traffic Restrictions to Affect Fourth Avenue Areas,” *Arizona Daily Star*, March 29, 2001.

³¹⁶ Bryn Bailer, “This Town’s Coming up Wildcats,” *Arizona Daily Star*, March 31, 2001.

³¹⁷ Miranda, *2001 NCAA Championship Deployment*, 12–13.

³¹⁸ Hannah Plotkin, “Police Prepare for Possible Riots over NCAA Championships,” *The Daily Wildcat*, March 23, 2014, accessed July 9, 2015, <http://www.wildcat.arizona.edu/article/2014/03/police-prepare-for-possible-riots-over-ncaa-championships>.

Figure 10. Celebration or Rioting?



Source: Plotkin, “Police Prepare for Possible Riots over NCAA Championships.”

An expectation of victory in 2014,³¹⁹ coupled with stories about heavy police presence on the night of the games,³²⁰ established the tone for the students.

Prior to the 2014 Final Four, the Tucson Police Department partnered the University of Arizona, Department of Athletics and the University of Arizona Police Department to create a public service announcement asking for students to “Bear Down with Pride.”³²¹ It was released on March 28, 2014. Arizona won the Sweet Sixteen game on March 27, and lost the Elite Eight game on March 29. Both games ended with clashes between students and the police in the Main Street Square area.³²²

The University of Florida celebrated victories through the Final Four semifinals leading up to the loss to Connecticut. Following that championship game, Connecticut had a small celebratory disturbance near campus, while Florida did not. It is also noted that the University of Florida has never experienced a sports event riot.³²³ Part of this reason has been attributed to the culture that the University of Florida has established over the years. The Gainesville Police Department allows the students to celebrate in the

³¹⁹ Greg Hansen, “Arizona Looks National-Title Good vs. Zags,” *Arizona Daily Star*, March 24, 2014.

³²⁰ “Police Patrolling Bar Areas Before, after Game,” *Arizona Daily Star*, March 29, 2014.

³²¹ Allen, Leavitt, and Roberts, *Board of Inquiry, 2014 NCAA Championship Deployment*, 3.

³²² Ibid.

³²³ Turner, “2014 NCAA Elite 8 Game.”

street, but the messaging has always been about celebrating positively. This includes a campaign of “hugs and high fives,” where it is not uncommon for the police to lead school chants.³²⁴ In 2015, the University of Arizona repeated its “Bear Down with Pride” campaign used in 2014, but this time the police handed out rubber wrist bands with this phrase to the students prior, during, and follow the game.³²⁵ This tactic gave the opportunity for the police and students to interact positively throughout the game. It must be noted that although Arizona lost in the Elite Eight game to Wisconsin (similarly to 2014), and there were no reported incidents following the game.³²⁶

3. Social Identity

As discussed in Chapter III, social identity occurs when an individual believes she or he has membership into the same social category, in this case, a group.³²⁷ In a sports riot, this process also begins prior to the game but strengthens throughout the sporting event. The evidence can be seen with simple fan support.

a. Social Categorization: 1997 and 2001

Tajfel and Turner describe this as social categorization, where people quickly assess and categorize others.³²⁸ Although social categorization has been occurring throughout the group interaction, it becomes very clear following the game. In 1997, the support of the Arizona Wildcats extended far beyond the students. The community rallied behind the team for each game—to the point of delirium.³²⁹ Following the semi-final victory, one fan told a reporter, “I have been waiting for this all my life. I live and die by the Wildcats. I’m so happy, I’m ready to go to the emergency room.”³³⁰ Wildcat fever turned into marketing, with merchandising spreading across the town to increase school

³²⁴ Ibid.

³²⁵ Turner, “2015 NCAA Tournament Plans and Operations,” 1.

³²⁶ Ibid.

³²⁷ Tajfel, *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*, 15.

³²⁸ Ibid., 28.

³²⁹ Burstein, “Rumble of Cheers Rolls across Tucson from Fans.”

³³⁰ Ibid.

spirit.³³¹ While on a national level, sports analysis predicting that Arizona would lose against Kentucky increased tensions between schools and increased the game intensity.³³²

The day of the game began early as fans that could not make the trip to the Final Four find a place to watch the game on television. In 1997 and 2001, the 4th Avenue bar district was the place to be for University of Arizona fans. Known for the vast number of sports bars and the close proximity to campus, area businesses heavily promoted the basketball championship. The 1997 Tucson Police Department AAR documented thousands of fans in the 4th Avenue area during and following the game.³³³ Each fan wore school colors and cheered for his/her team as the game commenced. One student told a reporter, “I’ve never seen so much school spirit in my life. This makes all the hard years at school worth it.”³³⁴ As discussed in Chapter III, game importance and fans centralizing are two factors needed to increase the social identity of the fans.

The data collected from the 2001 game paints a better picture of how the crowd in the bars began developing group cohesion. At the start of the game, most students were inside of the bar watching, with a few smaller groups outside due to the bars being at capacity.³³⁵ The mood of the crowd was mostly celebratory prior to the game; however, there was a clear police presence, as opposed to 1997. Video evidence presented to the 2001 board of inquiry shows a majority of the students in and around the bars wearing school colors (blue and red) and in a positive, celebratory mood.³³⁶ The video also showed that the crowds were small groups of people walking together or standing in lines waiting to enter the bars.³³⁷ As the game begins, the cheering on the video is positive and supportive of the school.³³⁸ Chants of “U of A” can be heard on the tape, as well as

³³¹ Bailer, “This Town’s Coming up Wildcats.”

³³² “Slurring the Wildcats,” *Arizona Daily Star*.

³³³ Danaher, *1997 NCAA Championship Game after Action Report*.

³³⁴ Lima, Brown, and Hernandez, “Loud, Naked, Drunken Fans Storm Tucson.”

³³⁵ Miranda, *2001 NCAA Championship Deployment*, 14.

³³⁶ Ibid., video evidence: Schur, 3:00.

³³⁷ Ibid., video evidence: Schur, 4:00.

³³⁸ Ibid., video evidence: Schur, 4:30.

cheering and clapping.³³⁹ The board of inquiry notes that very few problems occurred during the game itself, other than a few minor isolated fights.³⁴⁰ However, at the beginning of the game, officers were lined up across the street, but allowed people to pass through. Although the officers were not wearing tactical equipment (helmets and face masks), “the line immediately attracted the attention of people, some of whom feigned charges on the officers and challenged them verbally.”³⁴¹ One student told a reporter, “I think what really started freaking out the kids was seeing all the police lined up and down the road.”³⁴² Others people took the time to chat with the officers and take photographs with them as a novelty.³⁴³

In 1997, upon the conclusion of the game, the students poured out of the bars and into the streets. The smaller crowds joined with the younger students and other fans to make a very large crowd estimated to be in the thousands by some media sources.³⁴⁴ The Tucson Police Department’s AAR estimated the “rowdy crowds” to be about 150–200.³⁴⁵ The media played a significant part in the building of crowd energy, and it was identified in the AAR as drawing students to the area, as well as drawing students to the lights of the cameras.³⁴⁶ The crowds reacted similarly following the conclusion of the 2001 championship game.

Although the police were significantly better prepared in 2001, large numbers of student quickly overwhelmed the officers. The 2001 after action report estimated the total number of students to be about 2,500 in the 4th Avenue bar district, compared to 400 police officers in riot gear.³⁴⁷ However, it was clear on the video that students were

³³⁹ Ibid., video evidence: Schur, 6:00.

³⁴⁰ Ibid., 14.

³⁴¹ Ibid., 12.

³⁴² Arthur H. Rotstein, “Arizona Fans Turn Rowdy,” *USA Today*, April 3, 2001.

³⁴³ Miranda, 2001 *NCAA Championship Deployment*, 12.

³⁴⁴ Lima, Brown, and Hernandez, “Loud, Naked, Drunken Fans Storm Tucson.”

³⁴⁵ Danaher, 1997 *NCAA Championship Game after Action Report*.

³⁴⁶ Ibid.

³⁴⁷ Miranda, “Championship Game Memo,” April 3, 2001.

coming into the area on bikes from surrounding neighborhoods,³⁴⁸ so not all fans in the streets from the bars. This area later became the “focal point of the crowd’s escalation and the genesis of the riotous activity.”³⁴⁹ Of the conditions discussed in Chapter III, centralization of the students occurred in 1997 and the 2001 championship games, although the outcome of the games were significantly different.

b. Social Categorization: 2014 and 2015

The circumstances in 2014 and 2015 in Tucson were similar to that of previous year, including large number of fans filling the bar districts and overflowing onto the sidewalks.³⁵⁰ In 2014, the students changed locations where they watched the game from the 4th Avenue area to the Main Street Square. The interaction with police was also significantly different. In 2014 and 2015, strategy of the Tucson Police Department was to have officers in groups of “2 to 4...mingle with the crowd and provide positive police interaction.”³⁵¹ However, immediately following the Sweet Sixteen victory, the students exited the bars and centralized in the middle of the street.³⁵² This was the first time that student centralized following a Sweet Sixteen game at Arizona. For the Elite Eight game, Tucson Police deployed 140 officers to the Main Street Square area to deter unlawful behavior.³⁵³ Although the presence was obvious, it did not deter the students from centralizing in the street after the game.³⁵⁴

Cameras on police officers’ helmets captured the crowd behavior immediately following the conclusion of the Elite Eight loss to Wisconsin. The students appeared to be dressed in similar apparel as previous years (shirts and shorts showing support for the team).³⁵⁵ Initially, the video shows a small group of students centralizing in the middle of

³⁴⁸ Miranda, 2001 NCAA *Championship Deployment*, video evidence: Schur, 8:00.

³⁴⁹ Ibid., 14.

³⁵⁰ Allen, Leavitt, and Roberts, *Board of Inquiry, 2014 NCAA Championship Deployment*, 5.

³⁵¹ Ibid.

³⁵² “Police Patrolling Bar Areas before, after Game,” *Arizona Daily Star*.

³⁵³ Allen, Leavitt, and Roberts, *Board of Inquiry, 2014 NCAA Championship Deployment*, 4.

³⁵⁴ Ibid., 5.

³⁵⁵ Ibid., video “BWC49 Fisher (6:29)”

the street and near the Modern Streetcar station, while a larger crowd milled around the area in small groups.³⁵⁶ The environment at first appeared friendly, with people taking photos and videos, and posing with the officers. There was a clear separation of space however between the officer and the students. As the crowd grew in size, the officers stayed near buildings and away from the epicenter of the group in the street.³⁵⁷

c. Social Identification: 1997 and 2001

The 2001 championship provides an excellent example of *social identification*.³⁵⁸ While in the middle of the intersection, the crowd began chanting “U of A,” which later turned into “Fuck Duke” (the opposing team). With the process of social identification, the crowd of fan began to unite as it is developing its identity. As discussed in Chapter III, the group tendency is to inflate its own importance while diminishing the value of the opposing group.³⁵⁹ At this point, the opposing team signifies the out-group.

Following the initial chanting, the students were seen on video milling in the street. During this time, the students were talking to each other, high-fiving, and chanting in smaller groups. Many students are simply standing in the street alone, watching others.³⁶⁰ Shouldering³⁶¹ and climbing occurred in 2001 as the group began to grow in size.³⁶² Immediately following the initial centralization, climbing and shouldering appear to be done to gain a height advantage.³⁶³

³⁵⁶ Ibid., video “FLEX.X78002657.0225.140329.204202.1803.”

³⁵⁷ Ibid., video “BWC49 Fisher (6:29)”

³⁵⁸ Tajfel, *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*, 16.

³⁵⁹ Ibid., 34.

³⁶⁰ Miranda, *2001 NCAA Championship Deployment*, video evidence: Schur, 8:30.

³⁶¹ When a person, usually a female, gets on the shoulders of another.

³⁶² Miranda, *2001 NCAA Championship Deployment*, 15.

³⁶³ Ibid., video evidence: Schur, 8:48.

d. Social Identification: 2014 and 2015

The 2014 University of Arizona riot showed a similar milling period immediately following the initial centralizing of the students.³⁶⁴ The board of inquiry (BOI) noted that many of the patrons left the area soon after the game but about a thousand remained.³⁶⁵ Video evidence shows how many students milling while watching another group of students defiantly facing police.³⁶⁶ Unlike the 2001 BOI, which provided a play-by-play of events, the 2014 BOI did not discuss the dynamics of the crowd other than identifying various behavioral traits (e.g., throwing of objects and lighting of fireworks). Helmet camera video captured this moment. The fireworks appeared to have come from the center of the street and drew the attention of many students who were milling on the peripheral.³⁶⁷ In response, the police activated sirens and moved the police motorcycles closer to the students in the street. The sound attracted more students, who could be seen running from off-camera into the center of the street.³⁶⁸ The students in the streets were the first of the more obvious honor challenges and attracted a modest number of students into the middle. The firework exploding in the middle of the group was the next obvious challenge. However, the police response (sirens) seemed to have increased the energy of the crowd and size of the group in the street.

The 2015 after action report did not discuss any crowd behaviors and instead only focused on tactical and operational considerations for the police. In addition, there were media reports about the strategy changing in 2015 over previous years where the police engaged the crowd in a “friendlier” manner.³⁶⁹ The after action report noted that there

³⁶⁴ Allen, Leavitt, and Roberts, *Board of Inquiry, 2014 NCAA Championship Deployment*, video “FLEX.X78002657.0225.140329.204202.1803”

³⁶⁵ Ibid., 4.

³⁶⁶ Bret Buganski, *University of Arizona Riots after Elite 8 Loss*, accessed August 25, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SmLUCMmEdMA>.

³⁶⁷ Allen, Leavitt, and Roberts, *Board of Inquiry, 2014 NCAA Championship Deployment*, video: “BWC11 Horn (7:00),”

³⁶⁸ Ibid., video “FLEX.X78002657.0225.140329.204202.1803.”

³⁶⁹ Yoohyun Jung, “Police: Softer Approach for Tourney—Incident Last Year Prompts Department to Alter Its Tactics,” *Arizona Daily Star*, March 24, 2015.

were “no significant incidents” following the 2015 event. The differences between 2014 and 2015 are discussed further in Chapter IV.

e. Social Comparison: 1997 and 2001

The honor/challenging phase ends the milling by giving the group positive distinction.³⁷⁰ Generally, the first challenge comes by the group of students entering and taking control over the street. As the growing crowds overwhelm the police, anonymity increases and individuals become empowered to continue these challenges. In 2001, the first firework was seen in the crowd during the milling period.³⁷¹ The energy grew as more people from outside the area walked into the group, which within the next 30 minutes grew to over 1,000 people.³⁷² These challenges lead to the groups circularing around the activity. Figure 11 shows students circularing around a mosh pit follow the 2001 championship game.

Figure 11. Students Circularing around a Mosh Pit



Source: Miranda, *2001 NCAA Championship Deployment*, video evidence, Schur.

³⁷⁰ Hogg, “A Social Identity Theory of Leadership,” 200.

³⁷¹ Miranda, *2001 NCAA Championship Deployment*, 14.

³⁷² Ibid.

In both 1997 and 2001, the crowds continued to grow and increase energy as the police moved away from the epicenter for safety. As a result, the police may not have been able to see much of the activity in the epicenter.³⁷³ The report by Miranda noted, in the 2001 incident, the first mosh pit develop near the center of the crowd; however, the police were not nearby, and they may not have noticed it developing.³⁷⁴ According to video evidence, the first of several fights broke out due to the mosh pit activity, although the police remained unaware. Also noted the Miranda report, this group was “agitating” the crowd and that people were “feeding off” the activity.³⁷⁵ In a build up to a potential riot, this condition of anonymity allows activity to continue unchallenged by police.

At this point in 2001 after the game in Tucson, people began entering the crowd wear ski masks covering their faces, presumably for anonymity.³⁷⁶ Shortly later, people began climbing light poles and small fights broke out.³⁷⁷ The first “incident exposure” occurred around this same time, and the mosh pit activity “picked up markedly.”³⁷⁸ When the police attempted to intervene, the crowd turned aggressive toward them.³⁷⁹ Each individual trait can be considered a honor challenge against the police, who are now seen as the out-group. The pattern that begins to take form starts slowly but quickly escalates as the crowd grows and the group builds cohesion. Once challenges stop, the crowd enters the milling phase again. For example, in 2001, police reported that the crowd was settling down, but this quickly reversed when people began rocking street signs.³⁸⁰

In 2001, the police recognized that the group of students “turned nasty,” and the decision was made to pull the group out of the crowd.³⁸¹ The group began chanting “fuck

³⁷³ Ibid.

³⁷⁴ Ibid.

³⁷⁵ Ibid.

³⁷⁶ Ibid., 15.

³⁷⁷ Ibid., 16.

³⁷⁸ Miranda, *2001 NCAA Championship Deployment*, 15.

³⁷⁹ Ibid., 15–16.

³⁸⁰ Ibid., 15.

³⁸¹ Ibid., 16.

police,” and several officer reported having liquid thrown at them.³⁸² Although the police remained on the outskirts of the group, the “size and action of the crowd prevented most people from noting any police presence.”³⁸³ Within an hour and a half of the game ending, the first bar (O’Malley’s) reported that there was a “huge riot outside, [and] they’re trying to break all the windows to the business.”³⁸⁴ The next 30 minutes witnessed a series of escalating behavior that included setting fires in the middle of the road, flipping cars and burning cars, and eventually the arson of an occupied business. As this behavior occurred, the helicopter observer noticed that “approximately half” of the group rapidly fled the area at this time, leaving only the core group of rioters.³⁸⁵ As the skirmish line of police moved in to clear the area, informal leaders surfaced by sitting in the middle of the street to block the officers’ attempts to get to the fires burning nearby.³⁸⁶ As the skirmish line advanced, the core group of about 200 people began throwing rocks at the officers, with shouts of encouragement heard from within the crowd.³⁸⁷ The social comparison phase is a constant reevaluation to determine positive identity.³⁸⁸ The cause of the group splitting was many individuals lost value in what the main group now represented.

f. Social Comparison: 2014 and 2015

In 2014, following the University of Arizona’s Elite Eight loss to Wisconsin, video shows large portions of milling students energized following the firework explosion and the police activating sirens.³⁸⁹ As this group grows in size, the video also shows the police move motorcycles up to face the group and other officers in riot gear³⁹⁰

³⁸² Ibid.

³⁸³ Ibid.

³⁸⁴ Ibid.

³⁸⁵ Ibid., 17.

³⁸⁶ Ibid., 17–18.

³⁸⁷ Ibid., 2.

³⁸⁸ Hogg, “A Social Identity Theory of Leadership,” 184–200.

³⁸⁹ Allen, Leavitt, and Roberts, *Board of Inquiry, 2014 NCAA Championship Deployment*, video “FLEX.X78002657.0225.140329.204202.1803.”

³⁹⁰ Consisting of helmets, face shields, and gas masks.

lining up in a skirmish line.³⁹¹ Figure 12 shows an overhead view of the positioning of the police.

Figure 12. Police and Students Face Off Prior to Rioting



Source: "Upset Fans Take to the Streets, Police Fight Back with Force," *KGUN*, accessed August 26, 2015, <http://www.scrippsmedia.com/kgun9/news/Upset-fans-take-to-the-streets-police-fight-back-253082761.html>.

In response, the several members of the group stood between the main part of the group and the motorcycle officers waving their arms upward in encouragement to the group and taunting the officers.³⁹² This is another honor challenge by the in-group (of students). Even at the point where the officers are about to engage the students, other students watch nearby, indecisive about whether to leave or to stay, despite repeated orders to leave the area by police. When the police ordered the crowd to disperse, few people left the area (another honor challenge).³⁹³

With each challenge, the group seemed become increasingly confident about overtly challenging the police.³⁹⁴ Even when the police deploy pepperballs³⁹⁵ at the

³⁹¹ Allen, Leavitt, and Roberts, *Board of Inquiry, 2014 NCAA Championship Deployment*, video "FLEX.X78002657.0225.140329.204202.1803."

³⁹² Ibid.

³⁹³ Ibid.

³⁹⁴ Ibid., video: "BWC46 Voss."

³⁹⁵ Oleoresin Capsicum shot out of a gun using compressed air, similar to a paintball gun.

individuals, some endure it out of defiance. Figure 13 shows a student being hit several times before being arrested by police.

Figure 13. Student Challenges Police during 2014 Arizona Riot



Source: WorldWide TV, “Arizona Students in NCAA Basketball Loss Riot,” YouTube video, accessed August 26, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VD-sv3giCt8>.

As the group maintained its defiance against police, members of the crowd began chanting, “Fuck the police,” sparking more objects to be thrown from the back of the crowd, where the large mass of anonymous students prevailed.³⁹⁶ In 2014, the types of challenges by the students differed from 1997 and 2001. For instance, in 2014, the board of inquiry reported fireworks and some climbing, but the majority of the activity reported was objects being thrown at officers.³⁹⁷ Additionally, the 2014 riot lacked fires, flashing, and mosh pits, as seen in previous riots in Tucson.³⁹⁸

In 2015, the students centralized in the streets following the Elite Eight loss to Wisconsin, as they had in previous years. However, this year the police remained in close contact with the students. Although there were two arrests, neither was related to the

³⁹⁶ Allen, Leavitt, and Roberts, *Board of Inquiry, 2014 NCAA Championship Deployment*, video: “BWC46 Voss.”

³⁹⁷ Ibid., 6.

³⁹⁸ Ibid.

celebration.³⁹⁹ Although there is a lack of data to explain why the 2015 event ended peacefully while other events turned violent, the strategy of having officers remain in close proximity to the crowd may have prevented the smaller groups from joining into a larger group.

Chapter V provides overall analysis of the different events to highlight patterns among each event, as well as provides recommendations to police for future events.

³⁹⁹ Turner, “2015 NCAA Tournament Plans and Operations,” 1.

V. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS


An effective security organization is a dynamic entity that is always organizing, and never fully organized.

— Karl Weick, *The Social Psychology of Organizing*

The initial analysis of the data of the four incidents at the University of Arizona sought to establish whether there are behavioral patterns with the students and the police, or in any combination. The analysis first identifies common behaviors seen at the four different case studies between 1997 and 2015. Next, it examines the different conditions identified in Chapter III to determine if these conditions were present during any of the games. Finally, documentation for each game is examined to determine if traits associated with normalization and the social identity theory are present.

The next few sections describe a process of normalization and social identity of a sport crowd as it turns from individuals into a collective group. Figure 14 provides visual support of this process by showing how the more common traits and conditions relate.

Figure 14. Sport Riot Decision Tree



A. CONDITIONS

Initial examination shows several conditions present at each of the events that could affect the final outcome. First, the locations where the students accumulate seems to focus around the popular bar districts close to student housing. These locations were

accurately predicted by the police prior to each game, although the locations changed between years 2001 and 2014. Although centralization also provides the social environment for watching these events, it also appears to be a necessary component for a riot to occur. In the 2001 board of inquiry for the University of Arizona riot documented that immediately following the conclusion of the game,

Approximately 300 people had gathered on 4th Avenue in front of O'Malleys [in the street]. A smaller group of about 50 had gathered in the intersection of 4th Avenue and 8th Street, which was later to become the focal point of the crowd's escalation and the genesis of the riotous activity.⁴⁰⁰

In every case study, centralization occurred, and this provided a venue for the celebration. Second, in all four case studies, the bars were at capacity with people overflowing out front. Large numbers of celebrators provide the environments for *anonymity* and *empowerment*. Third, uniformed police were present before, during, and following the games in all four case studies. Fourth, all four incidents included mostly male students in their early 20s and the heavy use of alcohol. However, as indicated in the 2001 board of inquiry,⁴⁰¹ not all rioters were students, and not all people drinking alcohol rioted. The Tucson Police Department 2001 Board notes this, stating that it would be “a mistake to assume that only University students were so engaged, since this event [basketball championship] was of interest to a far wider audience in Tucson.”⁴⁰² Considering that a large number of studies about these events identify alcohol as a factor, it cannot be dismissed; however, the data for this study did not provide enough details about the use of alcohol to give any further support than already in existence.

The same conclusion should be noted for age and gender of the participants. Although the video evidence in the boards of inquiries from 2001 and 2014 state that a majority of the participants were young (20s) men,⁴⁰³ it is difficult to identify a median age without a larger sample of actual data. Also, there were a number of women in the

⁴⁰⁰ Miranda, 2001 NCAA Championship Deployment, 14.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid., video evidence: Schur, 8:30. 14.

⁴⁰² Ibid., 32.

⁴⁰³ Ibid., video evidence: Schur, 8:30.

crowd intermingled with the men in all four cases. Therefore, while none of these observations allow for concrete conclusions about age and gender as a causal factor for riots, both can be construed as commonalities among these case studies. Due to this lack of data, it is impossible to determine conclusively what impact age and gender has on these events; however, there does appear to be a consistent pattern based on the video evidence.

Other conditions identified in Chapter III were game intensity and game importance. The importance of the game varies depending on the finality (season ending) and rivalries. However, the details of the case studies lack the data to show the impact of game importance, other than every game played in the NCAA tournament carries significant importance. In the NCAA men's basketball tournament, a loss ends the season for that team. This fact magnified the importance of each game as the team continues to win. In 1997, the newspaper articles before and following the game captured the importance of each game, but especially the final three games, where Arizona beat three number one ranked teams to win the championship.⁴⁰⁴ Rivalry games carry an importance without the finality. For example, the 2001 championship game between Arizona and Duke had the feel of a rivalry game; Duke was the favorite and had an already proven basketball dynasty with two national championships in six to the finals prior to this game.⁴⁰⁵ The 2014 and 2015 games were equally as important in terms of finality to Arizona, as it faced (and lost to) Wisconsin in the Elite Eight of both years. Nonetheless, 2014 ended with a sports riot while 2015 did not. There were several differences between these two years, one of which was the intensity of the game. Table 6 compares the different games to show the previous conditions impact the potential of a riot.

⁴⁰⁴ Don Markus, "Arizona Captures NCAA Title with OT Win over Kentucky," *The Tech*, April 1, 1997, Online edition, sec. Sports, <http://tech.mit.edu/V117/N15/ncaa.15w.html>

⁴⁰⁵ "NCAA Basketball Tournament History: Duke Blue Devils - ESPN," *ESPN*, accessed September 14, 2015, http://espn.go.com/mens-college-basketball/tournament/history/_team1/5847.

Table 6. Conditions for a Sports Riot

	Intense Game	Important Game	Centralization of Group
1997	Yes	Yes	Yes
2001	Yes	Yes	Yes
2014	Yes	Yes	Yes
2015	No	Yes	Yes

Game intensity is described as the energy and excitement of the game.⁴⁰⁶ When examining the four University of Arizona men's basketball games (1997, 2001, 2014, and 2015), each game that ended in a sports riot (1997, 2001, and 2014) concluded as a highly competitive game that was decided in the last minute.⁴⁰⁷ The 1997 championship game and 2014 Elite Eight both were closely fought contests that extended into overtime.⁴⁰⁸ The 2001 championship game was a three-point difference within the final two minutes of the contest.⁴⁰⁹ However, in 2015, the Arizona/Wisconsin rematch from the previous year, ended with Wisconsin having a comfortable lead throughout much of the second half.⁴¹⁰ Neither school rioted in 2015.⁴¹¹ There is far too little actual data to support this hypothesis fully; however, it remains a reasonable factor in the overall condition.

⁴⁰⁶ Described in Chapter III.

⁴⁰⁷ In 1997 Arizona (84) vs Kentucky (79) beat three #1 seeds to and won in overtime; 2001 Arizona (72) vs Duke (82) beat two #1 seeds to lose in Championship; 2014 Arizona (63) vs. Wisconsin (64) lost in overtime. In 1997, Arizona beat three number seeds to reach the Championship, where it won 84–79 over Kentucky in overtime. In 2001, Arizona beat two number-one seeds to reach the final, where they lost to Duke 72–82. And in 2014, Arizona lost to Wisconsin 64–63 in overtime.

⁴⁰⁸ Don Markus, "Arizona Captures NCAA Title with OT Win over Kentucky," *The Tech*, April 1, 1997, sec. Sports, <http://tech.mit.edu/V117/N15/ncaa.15w.html>; "Wisconsin Beats No. 1 Arizona in OT Thriller," *ESPN*.

⁴⁰⁹ NCAA on Demand, *2001 NCAA Basketball National Championship—Arizona vs Duke*, accessed September 13, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y8uMlmc8xyA>.

⁴¹⁰ "Arizona Wildcats vs. Wisconsin Badger—NCAA Tournament Game—Play by Play," *ESPN*.

⁴¹¹ Turner, "2015 NCAA Tournament Plans and Operations,"

B. NORMALIZATION

The impacts of social norming were evident in 1997 when Arizona experienced its first sports riot. Although students had celebrated games in the past, these celebrations had not turned into full riots. Media influence has been shown to be a powerful norming agent. Each story brings the fans closer to the team and makes them part of the team. As the event approaches, the excitement builds. There was very little information contained in the case studies themselves that identify social norming as a contributing factor to sports riots; however, news articles following the 1997 riots offered compelling links. Prior to 1997, the University of Arizona had never witnessed a sports riot first hand, yet the *Arizona Daily Wildcat*⁴¹² published an article following the championships game where a student was quoted as saying, “This is the way it’s supposed to be. I’d expect nothing less. Breaking lights, tipping over cars—I’d expect no less.”⁴¹³ The norm had been evolving through the media as other cities erupted in violence following their championships.

In an attempt to identify the potential danger, the 1997 after action report makes comparisons to other types of events around the country that resulted in violence; however, police assume that that sporting events have similarities to late night parties, political rallies, and animal rights demonstrations.⁴¹⁴ Although each of these events may have resulted in a riot, the crowds at each of these events are significantly different, making it difficult to compare these incidents to a sports riot. The Ohio State University Task Force on Preventing Celebratory riots identifies a similar error in its report, when it noted that most campus riots in the last two decades were “celebratory in nature.”⁴¹⁵ Recognizing this, the Tucson Police Department and University of Arizona began a public service announcement through the media and social media prior to the 2014 tournament to teach fans proper behavior following a sporting event.⁴¹⁶ The “Bear Down

⁴¹² The University of Arizona student-run newspaper.

⁴¹³ Altman, Jr. and Lima, “Post-Game Madness Overwhelms Police.”

⁴¹⁴ Danaher, *1997 NCAA Championship Game after Action Report*.

⁴¹⁵ Task Force on Preventing Celebratory Riots, *The Ohio State University*, 20.

⁴¹⁶ Turner, “2015 NCAA Tournament Plans and Operations,” 1.

with Pride” campaign aimed to teach students that it was acceptable to celebrate but with limitations. In years past, the students only rioted following the championship game, which gave the police time to get the messaging to the students. However, when the team lost in the Elite Eight game, the program had just been launched and was ineffective. Following the 2014 riot at the University of Arizona, the board of inquiry found that “social media was used by participants to share pictures and comments about the unfolding events, and this seemed to draw additional persons into the area.”⁴¹⁷ The report also notes positives in social media use, specifically relating to the cleanup efforts,⁴¹⁸ and how utilizing social media may be used to encourage positive behavior [by the students].⁴¹⁹ The 2014 board of inquiry also states, “Social media has a significant impact on operations involving large crowds.” Although the board falls short of qualifying that statement, it recommends the use of social media in future preparations.⁴²⁰ In 2015, the program was launched earlier in the tournament using television and social media as the platforms. Wristbands with the engraved phrase (Bear Down with Pride) were given to police officers to hand to students, providing opportunity for the police and the students to have personal conversations to enforce the message.

The evidence lacks the necessary detail to show conclusively social norming is a causal factor for sports riots. Even so, there are several behavioral traits common to each event that are also common in other sports around the world. For example, centralizing the streets shares characteristics with pitch invasions, where fans rush the field following a dramatic finish to a game.⁴²¹ Also, the messaging campaign between 2014 and 2015 provides strong evidence that positive messaging does influence behavior, considering that the conditions between these two years were fairly similar. Nevertheless, other factors may also have added to the outcome, such as the time of the game (daytime versus nighttime) and the intensity of the game. Based on these case studies alone, the

⁴¹⁷ Allen, Leavitt, and Roberts, *Board of Inquiry, 2014 NCAA Championship Deployment*, 8.

⁴¹⁸ Procter, Vis, and Voss, “Reading the Riots on Twitter,” 202.

⁴¹⁹ Allen, Leavitt, and Roberts, *Board of Inquiry, 2014 NCAA Championship Deployment*, 8.

⁴²⁰ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁴²¹ Wieberg, and O’Toole, “Fans on Field Cross the Line.”

link between norming and the development of a sports riot remains a partially supported hypothesis.

C. SOCIAL IDENTITY

Creating a link between social identity and how a crowd develops into a group during a sporting event has proven challenging due to the limited information that specifically relates to this social behavior. Police after action reports (AAR) and board of inquiry (BOI) investigations used in this study focus mainly on police tactics and strategies. The newspaper articles from 1997 offer some evidence as to how groups bond, even without obvious reasons. After the University of Arizona 1997 championship game, in an article titled, “Anyone Not on 4th Ave. Last Night?,” the author commented, “I’ve never felt like I had 30,000 family members, but last night on Fourth Avenue it was like one big family party. I’ve never given more high-fives and hugs to people that I have never met.”⁴²² The data provided by the 2001 BOI gave the best account of how the crowd developed, including a timelines of events. The video evidence used in the BOI provided a visual account; however, the video was not marked in a way to compare it to the BOI report. The 2014 BOI also used video evidence; however, the details in the narrative did not provide the same level detail about the crowd as 2001. The video in both cases provided excellent detail of how the crowd split into a centralized group in the middle of the street, and how this group reacted to the police. Details leading up to this point were less obvious unfortunately.

The beginnings of social identity are obvious in all four events, as evidenced by similar behavior in each. The informal membership begins with the fans coming to a centralized location (bar district), wearing common colors, and showing spirit for their team through common celebratory behaviors. As the intensity of each game increases, the crowd energy increases. This behavior was captured in newspaper clips from the 1997 event when it described some fan’s extreme emotions and over-exaggerated levels of excitement.⁴²³ This was also seen in the 2001 BOI evidence videotape when chants of “U

⁴²² Degel, “Anyone Not on 4th Ave. Last Night?”

⁴²³ Burstein, “Rumble of Cheers Rolls across Tucson from Fans.”

of A” could be heard.⁴²⁴ As the game continued, students began giving high-fives to strangers and the chants turn negative toward the opposing team. At the end of the game in each event, the students exited the bars and met in the middle of the street to celebrate.

Again, this celebration was well documented in 2001 and 2014 with students cheering and chanting together. In both situations, the students also turned this into derogatory chants against the opposing team. At this point, there appears to be evidence of an in-group (students) and an out-group (opposing team). Additionally, the presence of the police also provides a potential out-group, as evident by individuals challenging officers prior to the start of the game. For example, the board of inquiry for the 2014 riots at the University of Arizona described how the police standing nearby in helmets and face shields, and the use of police motorcycles with lights and sirens “appeared to agitate the crowd” of over 1000 students.⁴²⁵

The 2001 and 2014 BOIs also document periods of milling behaviors, where there is a lull in the activity and the students can be seen in smaller groups talking among themselves and watching other smaller groups or the main group in the middle of the street. Video of the 2001 University of Arizona sports riot showed large periods of milling, as small groups converged shortly after the game ended.⁴²⁶ Police reported that the crowd was “settling down” due to a lack of action.⁴²⁷ Following the 2015 University of Arizona Elite 8 loss to Wisconsin, students centralized in the middle of the street following the game. After a period of chanting, the tone quieted as students walked around, asking each other if they thought a riot would occur this year as it had in previous years.⁴²⁸ When a group fails to retain positive distinction, it weakens the group social identity, as it did in 2015. Even so, this behavior may continue until individuals within the main group present the first honor challenge.

⁴²⁴ Miranda, *2001 NCAA Championship Deployment*, video evidence: Schur, 6:00.

⁴²⁵ Allen, Leavitt, and Roberts, *Board of Inquiry, 2014 NCAA Championship Deployment*, 11.

⁴²⁶ Miranda, *2001 NCAA Championship Deployment*, video evidence, Skeenes, 2.

⁴²⁷ Ibid., 15–16.

⁴²⁸ Turner, “2015 NCAA Tournament Plans and Operations,” 4.

Honor challenges came in various behavioral traits but follow a pattern within each year. The 1997 AAR described students committing vandalism, projectiles thrown at officers, cars flipped, and fires set. Unfortunately, in 1997, the police were surprised of the escalation and did not appear to capture data as the students first centralized in the streets. The evidence related to the 2001 riot offered a much better description, since the officers were there for the entire time and witnessed the events. In 2001, students began with fireworks and mosh pit dancing, progressed to shoudering and flashing, and ended with vandalism, throwing projectiles at officers, flipping cars, and setting fires. A more obvious example occurred when a group of University of Arizona students sat in the middle of the street blocking the officers' attempts to get to the fires burning nearby.⁴²⁹ In 2014, the students again began with fireworks, but the police quickly organized, possibly eliminating the next few stages of challenges. Once confronted by the police, the students quickly escalated to committing vandalism and throwing projectiles at officers. As the police moved in to clear the streets, in the 1997, 2001, and 2014 incidents, there were also shared reports of individuals stepping in front of the rest of the group to passively challenge officers in what appeared to be an effort to excite the group. The escalation of the group in each case followed a similar pattern—with the exception of 2015. With each challenge to the officers, the center of the group united, as evidenced by cheers and taunting.

Through the process of stereotyping crowds, generally from prior knowledge, where police make the assumptions that crowds are groups and groups are dangerous.⁴³⁰ As a result, police officers react per their training and treat these groups as threats. Tactical training is based on worst-case scenarios, and sets the precedent for officers to always be prepared for any threat. For example, although only a fraction of traffic stops results in violence against the officer, officers are trained to treat every driver as a threat until the contact ends. To police officers, crowds represent a potential threat, since its unpredictability may quickly turn into an overwhelming situation. This is evident when examining policing behavior at large events. Video taken by police during the 2001 riots

⁴²⁹ Miranda, *2001 NCAA Championship Deployment*, 17–18.

⁴³⁰ Gorringe, and Rosie, “It’s a Long Way to Auchterarder.”

showed police officers mingling within the crowd up until the end of the game. As the crowd energized in the streets, the police began to move toward the surrounding sidewalks. Eventually, the video showed the police officers lined up in groups with their backs against the building walls.⁴³¹ There were no lesson plans in the academy training the officers to move from the center of the crowd. Simple *officer safety* principles guided them into this action to prevent someone from approaching their blindside; however, the tactic itself results in a separation of the police from the crowd and ultimately increases anonymity of the individuals within the group.

The videos from the various BOIs show how students launched projectiles at the officers from behind of the group, using anonymity as a shield. It also explained how mosh pits and fights occurred in the middle of the central group, away from the view of the police. Anonymity might not carry the literal meeting of “made or done by someone unknown,”⁴³² since it has been established that people tend to remain in smaller groups within the larger group.⁴³³ Furthermore, the tendency for students to climb on shoulders, poles, and lights places them in full view of the group and the police. This suggests that anonymity in this situation may imply a lower probability of being arrested.

D. POLICE UNDER-REACTION/OVER-REACTION (CHALLENGE/RESPONSE CYCLE)

The reaction of the police in each incident affected the group’s behavior. In 1997, a lack of police response contributed to the escalation of the crowd and provided the conditions that allowed the group to become more cohesive.⁴³⁴ In 2001, the separation of the police to the outsides of the central group enhanced the conditions of anonymity within the group and allowed challenges to continue and escalate without an appropriate response.⁴³⁵ At one point in 2001, the police left the area to prepare for a skirmish line.

⁴³¹ Lehner, Robinson, and Stoner, *Board of Inquiry, 2001 NCAA Championship* (video surveillance tapes).

⁴³² “Anonymous,” *Merriam-Webster Dictionary*, September 14, 2015. ⁴³³ Lewis, *Sports Fan Violence in North America*, 137.

⁴³³ Lewis, *Sports Fan Violence in North America*, 137.

⁴³⁴ Miranda, *2001 NCAA Championship Deployment*, 54.

⁴³⁵ Ibid.

The 2001 BOI blamed this action for increasing the volatility of the crowd by delaying the police response.⁴³⁶ A complete absence of police also led to a lack of appropriate response to challenges, thus increasing the group identity.

In 2014, the police were admittedly unprepared for a riot following the Elite Eight loss. The police moved into a skirmish line but did not advance toward the group, causing the appearance of a group versus group standoff in the middle of the street. As previously established, threat of an out-group increased the cohesion of the in-group.⁴³⁷ Police over-reaction has a similar impact on the group, although the data in these case studies did not show crowd reaction; possibly because group cohesion dissipates when faced with a stronger group.⁴³⁸ The community reaction following the 2001 and 2014 riots placed police into a position of defending aggressive tactics.⁴³⁹

E. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the analysis, it is possible to determine a number of recommendations to assist police with preparations for a possible student riot following a sporting event. The recommendations follow the same decision tree established in Chapter III but will highlight optimal points for police to influence group behavior within the crowd. Figure 15 is the decision tree first introduced in earlier in this chapter.


⁴³⁶ Ibid.

⁴³⁷ Moghaddam, “The Psychology of Fear.”

⁴³⁸ Reeves, *The Dynamics of Group Behavior*, 125.

⁴³⁹ The 2001 riot resulted in a number of complaints and lawsuits against police. The 2014 riot resulted in a number of complaints, and one lawsuit filed against police. Miranda, *2001 NCAA Championship Deployment*; Tim Steller, “Tucson Police Still Learning to Handle the ‘Sportsriot,’” *Arizona Daily Star*. April 2, 2014.

Figure 15. Sport Riot Decision Tree with Recommendations



Based on the evidence in combination with the social identity theory, the easiest points to influence the crowd is during the milling and circularing phases, where the crowd is searching for a purpose. The following are recommendations to police for achieving this positive influence.

1. Influence the Norm through Positive Messaging

The five-school comparison in Chapter IV revealed an absence of any patterns of student riots. While the comparison was clearly too small in numbers of schools examined, it did note that the University of Florida has never experienced any type of riot, even though Florida has a deep history of championship victories in several sports. Florida credits this success to positive messaging about celebrating responsibly.⁴⁴⁴ The University of Arizona used similar messaging 2015, which proved effective. Although the examples are limited, positive messaging could contrast social norming impact of other events where riots occur. Partnerships between police, schools, and business owners could continue this effort throughout the year at other less-important sporting events so the norm is anchored in time for the championships.

2. Maintain Constant Contact with the Group

Recognizing of the different stages leading up to a sports riot may act as a predictor of a violent clash, but preventing it requires influencing the group as it forms. In addition to influencing the norm, police officers may be able to influence the group itself. The strategy used at the University of Arizona in 2015 placed police officers in constant contact with the group once it centralized in the street. In previous years, these officers moved to the edges to monitor the activity; however, as the honor challenges occurred, the officers either could not see it or were not in a position to take any action. Maintaining constant contact with the students reduce anonymity and prevents students from becoming empowered by the size and energy of the group. Additionally, by maintaining interaction with the students, officers will prevent the smaller groups from merging into a large, cohesive group.

⁴⁴⁴ Turner, “2014 NCAA Elite 8 Game.”

3. Interact with People Milling Rather than Directing Them

The initial rush of students into the street (centralizing) is difficult for police to prevent. The analysis shows that the epicenter of his activity tends to be a smaller group, with larger subgroups milling around this group. During this period, students who are milling are looking for positive distinction within the group, which is gained through honor challenges. The 2014 BOI video showed that people milling round the main group, especially those in casual contact with police, tended to comply to police directions more than people that the police were surrounding.⁴⁴⁵ If the police officers provide people who are milling with their own positive distinction their group, they will be less likely to develop an identity with the group centralized in the street. Elton Reeves posits that group cohesion decreases when there is no threat. In other words, “the well man never thinks of his health.”⁴⁴⁶

4. Prevent Prolonged Circularing

Evidence in the cases studies support the theory that honor challenges do not only attract the attention of the police, they also build cohesion within the group and could potentially provide positive distinction for people that have not yet identified with the group. The simple activity of lighting a firework, climbing a pole, or lighting a small fire draws the attention and cheers of group members and spectators and creates the circularing of the group. This circularing disrupts milling by giving the group a common focal point. Quickly responding to this challenge will reduce the circularing effect and return people to a state of milling; however, the response must be reasonable, or the response itself will reinforce the grouping behavior.

5. Manage Individuals within the Crowd, Rather than the Crowd

The key to managing people within a crowd is to address the individual about individual behaviors, rather than the crowd for individual behaviors. Hoggett and Scott wrote, “When the police hold a view of the crowd as inherently irrational and dangerous

⁴⁴⁵ Allen, Leavitt, and Roberts, *Board of Inquiry, 2014 NCAA Championship Deployment*, video evidence.

⁴⁴⁶ Reeves, *The Dynamics of Group Behavior*, 109.

they rely upon tactics of mass containment and dispersal.”⁴⁴⁷ The classical view of policing crowds sees the crowd itself as hostile,⁴⁴⁸ causing a mass police response to individual behaviors seen within the crowd. This lack of crowd understanding was evident in 1997, when the Tucson Police Department borrowed Miami-Dade Police Department’s civil disobedience crowd control model to prepare for future sporting events,⁴⁴⁹ two completely different crowd ideologies. Managing the individuals who are challenging the police will reduce the potential of the crowd developing a social identity.

6. Evaluate All Events, Even If They End Peacefully

Analyzing data from these case studies proved challenging due to the way police departments document events in boards of inquiry and after action reports. In an effort to avoid making similar mistakes, police departments tend to focus on tactical mistakes rather than effective strategies. In the case of crowd control, there are cases examining what went poorly but very little documenting successes. This lack of data makes it difficult to compare cases with good outcome to those with bad outcomes in order to establish best strategies.

7. Compare Apples to Apples When Training and Planning for a Sports Riot

Departments should examine the types of disturbances experienced in their community before determining the best course of action. The 1997 after action report recommended that the Tucson Police Department begin a nationwide search for a strategic model to suppress civil unrest. At the time, the Miami-Dade Police Department was the national leader for managing large crowds, given its extensive experience with protests and civil unrest.⁴⁵⁰ Sports riots are significantly different in composition although they may appear similar on the surface. Sending commanders to different police departments during the 2014 Final Four gave Tucson police commanders a better

⁴⁴⁷ James Hoggett, and Clifford Stott, “The Role of Crowd Theory in Determining the Use of Force in Public Order Policing,” *Policing and Society* 20, no. 2 (2010): 223, DOI: 10.1080/10439461003668468.

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid., 232.

⁴⁴⁹ Danaher, *1997 NCAA Championship Game after Action Report*.

⁴⁵⁰ Ibid. The department was called “Metro-Dade Police Department” in the actual document.

understanding of how each department manages their student, although the strategies vastly differed.⁴⁵¹

⁴⁵¹ Turner, “2014 NCAA Elite 8 Game.”

VI. CONCLUSION

The evolution of managing riots has had a tumultuous history of conflict between protestors and the police. From military tactics in ancient Greece, to the use of water cannons in Alabama during the 1960 Civil Rights protests, to the more recent Ferguson demonstrations, police continue the quest to maintain order within the expectations of the community. Today's college sport riot maintains the same feel as a political demonstration, resulting in a similar police response; however, sporting events lack the ideology that demonstrations bring that bonds the participants together. Furthermore, commonly cited causes of sports riots, such as the notion that alcohol is the main contributor, lacks consistency from event to event. There are many consistent behavioral traits seen within the crowd that seems to escalate the energy of a sports celebrations where riots occur, such as fireworks, climbing, small fires, fights, and projectiles thrown at police. At the same time, police departments use blanket strategies when dealing with crowds, much of which is built upon previous experiences or false assumption. For example, while scholarly theories may appropriately conclude that sports riots include intoxicated males in their young 20s, intoxication alone does not lead to a riot, which makes this more of a common characteristic than a causal factor of a sports riot. Additionally, although police have adopted the negotiated management style of working with crowds rather than against them,⁴⁵² this practice is more effective with a group that has centralized leadership. Sports riots are quite different from other types of demonstrations and as such need tailored strategies. These reasons sparked the need for a more comprehensive look at the behavior that leads up to a sports riot.

The five events at the University of Arizona presented very similar crowd characterizes that provided the conditions needed for the fans to join together in celebration; the location of the celebration was always in a bar district near student housing; the games were always later in the tournament; the students always centralized in the street following the game; and the police were always present. However, the result

⁴⁵² Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter, *Policing Protest: The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).

following the game was not always a riot, leading to the conclusion that one or more subtle characteristics may play a large part in preventing a riot.

Using the social normalization and the social identity theory (SIT) as models provides a different foundation that focuses less on behaviors within the crowd and more on crowds unite in to a collective group. Normalization occurs constantly throughout the year in the form of subtle messages that creates (when none exists) and changes acceptable social behaviors. In the case of sporting events, acceptable behavior is created through images of previous behavior provided by the media, social media, and other students across the country. Without a mechanism that helps define acceptable behavior, such as public information campaign, the student population will define its own. Normalization occurs prior to the game and throughout the conclusion, as seen in the form of individual behaviors, such wearing common clothing, behavior at the bars while watching the game, and centralizing in the street following the game—setting the boundaries of behavior in social situations.

A shared social identity begins prior to the games as students and other fans positively interact in support of their team. They develop an informal membership through the wearing of team colors, cheering, high-fiving, and other gestures that increase cohesion within the crowd under the common ideology of team support. The importance and intensity of the game are conditions necessary to elevate the crowd excitement, while centralization following the game creates the necessary proximity for the crowd to finish the development into a collective group. Now that the group exists, members search for positive distinction (milling), which may come at the expense of another group (police). Through a series of small challenges, such as centralizing in the street or chanting negatively about the opposing sporting team, the in-group (students) build cohesion even further. The police see this escalation as a threat and respond by opting to clear the road. This final act creates an in-group/out-group conflict that ultimately results in escalation of honor challenges, which are now focused at the police. From this point, a full riot is inevitable.

This thesis offers a different explanation about why students act contrary to normal behavior during and following a sporting event. Results of the cases studies

support that fan grouping patterns are similar from year to year, even though there was an eighteen-year separation between the first and last event. These similar patterns, when examined through the SIT, gives predictability to the formation of a group, and thus offers police commanders preventative strategies for managing crowds rather than only relying on mitigating strategies, which ultimately result in conflict. It is noted that due to a lack data, further and specific studies are needed to provide more conclusive evidence to eliminate other conditions that may add to crowd dynamics. These studies include the impact of weather, including temperature and the time of day of the event. In addition, police departments must play a larger role in sports riot prevention by capturing related data during successful and unsuccessful events.

While the lessons learned from the University of Arizona sport riots between 1997 and 2015 provide significant detail about the progression of police strategy and tactics, the documentation lacks the detail necessary for police commanders to predict future conflict, leaving them to prepare for riots rather than building strategy for prevention. By following the recommendations introduced in the previous chapter, law enforcement will have the necessary tools to influence groups of students in order to stop sports riots before they begin.

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